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Federally subsidized crop insurance has a long history of underwriting losses. 
These losses may be due to premium rating procedures that do not account, as fully as 
possible, for differences in yield loss risk across farms.  If farmers understand their own 
yield loss risk in more detail than is reflected in crop insurance premium rates, an 
information asymmetry may be leading to adverse selection or moral hazard.  Regional 
differences in underwriting losses suggest that the effect of asymmetric information is 
relatively large where inter-farm yield variability is also relatively large.   
An econometric model is used to identify asymmetric information in crop 
insurance premium rating.  A simulation model is used to compare existing crop 
insurance premium rates to alternative rates calculated using yield loss risk measures 
based on existing, farm-specific yield history data.  Both models are applied to 
crop/region combinations where inter-farm yield variability is relatively low (non-
irrigated corn in the Corn Belt region) and where inter-farm yield variability is relatively 
high (non-irrigated, continuously cropped wheat in the Northern Plains).   
   
Region-wide asymmetric information effects are identified for both regions, but 
the asymmetric information effect is found to be larger in the high variability region.  
This difference explains at least part of the inter-regional difference in underwriting 
losses.  The simulation analysis suggests that, on average, across an entire region, 
premium rates derived from a farm-specific measure of yield variability are closer to 
actuarially fair rates than RMA premium rates.  At a county- and farm-level, however, it 
is much more difficult to say, with a high level of statistical confidence, whether these 
alternate premium rates are closer than RMA rates to the actuarially fair rates. 
To provide a foundation for the crop insurance models, an econometric model of 
crop yields is estimated and used to separate total yield variation into systematic and 
random components.  Random yield variation is tested against several common 
distributions, including normal, gamma, and beta.  The effect of aggregation on the 
representation of both systematic and random yield variation is also investigated. 
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Chapter 1: Introduction 
 
The Risk Management Agency (RMA) of the U.S. Department of Agriculture 
offers highly subsidized crop insurance to producers of a wide range of agricultural 
commodities.  RMA rates crop insurance premiums using farm-specific data on yield 
mean but county-level data on yield variability.  A number of analysts have argued that 
use of county-level rather than farm-level estimates of yield variability has resulted in 
asymmetric information, leading to adverse selection and/or moral hazard problems in the 
crop insurance program (e.g., Just et al.; Vandeveer and Lohman; Makki and Sumwaru).  
Regional differences in underwriting losses also suggest that asymmetric information 
problems could be more severe in some regions than in others (Glauber). 
Can existing crop insurance yield history data, collected and maintained by RMA, 
be used to reduce asymmetric information in crop insurance premium rating?  In this 
report, I investigate the information content of RMA crop insurance yield history data, 
particularly with respect to yield variability.  I use these data, along with crop insurance 
contract data, to (1) identify asymmetric information in crop insurance premium rating, 
(2) show how consequences of asymmetric information vary by regions, and (3) assess 
whether the use of existing yield histories could reduce asymmetric information in crop 
insurance premium rating.  I also use crop insurance yield data to investigate the 
distribution of farm-specific yields and the effect of spatial aggregation on the 
representation of yield variability. 
In this context, use of the term “asymmetric information” is a bit of a misnomer.  
The real question is whether RMA can use existing data more effectively in rating crop 
insurance contracts.  Nonetheless, previous authors have used the term in a similar 
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context (particularly Makki and Somwaru) and I follow that precedent.  Moreover, even 
if it is possible to reduce asymmetric information using farm-specific yield histories, 
some level of asymmetric information will likely remain.  It is likely that farmers know 
more about their yield loss risk than can be deciphered from yield history data.  Even 
when RMA possesses a full 10 year yield history, most farmers have site specific 
knowledge of soils, rainfall patterns, and other factors that may have contributed to past 
losses but may not be apparent in from the yield history.  So, even though a reduction in 
asymmetric information could help to reduce underwriting losses and could allow policy 
makers to reduce premium subsidies, some level of asymmetric information is inevitable. 
          
Crop Insurance:  A (Very ) Brief History  
Crop insurance has been widely available to U.S. producers at subsidized 
premium rates since 1980.  The Federal Crop Insurance Improvement Act of 1980 
mandated broad availability of multi-peril crop insurance and premium subsidies of up to 
30 percent.  It was hoped that crop insurance would replace annual, ad hoc disaster 
assistance.  During the 1980s and early 1990s, however, the crop insurance program was 
plagued by low participation and large underwriting losses.  During these years, crop 
insurance purchase peaked at about 25 percent of eligible acreage, except in years when 
crop insurance was a condition of eligibility for disaster assistance (Glauber).  Between 
1981 and 1993, moreover, crop insurance indemnities exceeded premium payments by 
about 50 percent, a loss of about $2.3 billion (USGAO).     
 In 1994, Congress approved another major revision to the crop insurance 
program.  The Crop Insurance Reform Act of 1994:  
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• increased premium subsidies for all levels of coverage (Table 1.1);  
• provided for coverage levels in excess of 75 percent (80 and 85 percent);  
• created catastrophic coverage (covers 50 percent of the yield at 55 percent of 
price) with a 100 percent premium subsidy (producers paid a flat $50 fee per 
crop); and   
• required commodity program participants to obtain at least catastrophic (CAT) 
crop insurance coverage. 
   
Table 1.1 Schedule of Premium Subsidies for Federally Subsidized Crop Insurance 
Coverage Level Premium Subsidy Rates 
Yield Price 1981-94 1995-981 2001-present1 
Percent Percent of Premium 
50 55 --
2 100 100 
55 100 30 46 64 
65 100 30 42 59 
75 100 17 24 55 
85 100 --
2 12 38 
Source:  Risk Management Agency, USDA 
1Ad hoc premium subsidy increases were enacted for the 1999 and 2000 crop years, but were similar 
to premium subsidy in effect from 2001 to the present.   
2CAT coverage and coverage over 75 percent were not offered before 1995 
 
In 1995 crop insurance participation increased dramatically, reaching 221 million 
acres (about 80 percent of eligible acreage) including 115 million acres of CAT coverage, 
with much of the increase in response to the commodity program requirement (Dimukes 
and Glauber).  After 1995, Congress dropped the insurance requirement for commodity 
program participants because producers complained that CAT coverage – despite low 
cost – provided little protection.  Over the next several years CAT coverage declined 
while buy-up coverage (coverage in excess of CAT) slowly increased in terms of both 
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acres and liability. Growth in newly created revenue insurance products (e.g., Crop 
Revenue Coverage) was particularly strong. 
  For the 1999 and 2000 crop years, Congress mandated additional premium 
subsidies and, beginning in the 2001 crop year, mandated permanent subsidy increases 
under the Agriculture Risk Protection Act of 2000.  With the new, higher subsidies, crop 
insurance participation once again rose sharply as producers insured more acreage and 
bought higher levels of coverage (Dismukes and Vandeveer).  By 2002, 80 percent of 
eligible acreage was covered with more than 50 percent of acreage covered at 70 percent 
or more. Between 1994 and 2003, moreover, indemnities paid were 98 percent of total 
premiums (not including the government subsidy).  These aggregate figures led some to 
conclude that the crop insurance program was on actuarially sound footing, even though 
the cost of premium subsidies pushed the overall cost of the crop insurance program to 
more than $2 billion per year (Glauber).   
The evidence, however, suggests that underlying actuarial problems continue.  
Despite large increases in crop insurance participation, large underwriting losses have 
persisted in parts of the Great Plains and the Southeast. These problems suggest that 
broader, subsidy-induced purchase of Federal crop insurance may have only masked 
underlying problems (Glauber).  Large subsidies may have encouraged producers with 
low yield risk (who have a relatively small chance of receiving crop insurance 
indemnities) to purchase crop insurance.  The underwriting gains from these producers 
may be offsetting the underwriting losses of others.    
Did the crop insurance reforms of 1994 and 2000 simply mask actuarial problems 
with higher participation driven by premium subsidies? A number of researchers have 
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argued that asymmetric information may be causing adverse selection or moral hazard 
problems in the Federal crop insurance program (e.g., Goodwin; Vandeveer and Lohman; 
Just et al., ; Makki and Sumwaru).  Farmers who know more than RMA does about 
potential yield loss will adjust their crop insurance purchases and/or production practices 
accordingly.  Producers who expect a positive net return to crop insurance are more likely 
to buy than producers who expected a negative return (adverse selection).  Producers may 
also be less diligent in protecting crops against loss if losses are indemnified (moral 
hazard).  
According to RMA actuarial documentation, premiums for yield-based insurance 
are rated using county-level data on potential yield loss, adjusted to farm–specific 
conditions using a farm-specific average yield obtained from yield histories maintained 
by RMA (Josephson et al.).  Skees and Reed showed that (1) yield means are 
independent of standard deviations, (2) the coefficient of variation generally declines as 
average yield risees, and (3) producers with higher yields tended to be associated with 
lower theoretical premium rates.  One way to make these three findings consistent with 
one another is to assume that yield variability (e.g., standard deviation) is roughly 
constant across producers.  If that is true, lower premium rates are appropriate for high-
yield producers as they are less likely to experience any given percentage loss in yield. 
RMA premium rating methods reflect these findings in the sense that they assume that 
expected loss is inversely related to average yield. 
The RMA base premium rate is a measure of yield loss risk that underlies the 
most popular crop insurance products:  Actual Production History (APH), Crop Revenue 
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Coverage (CRC), and Revenue Assurance (RA).  In the simplest terms, the base premium 


























~ is the RMA rate yield1 on farm j, Ry  is the county-level reference yield, e is the 
exponent, REFρ  is the county-level reference rate (an adjusted version of the county-level 
loss-cost ratio or LCR), and F is the fixed rate load that accounts for prevented planting, 
catastrophic losses, etc.  In its most basic form, the county-level LCR is total indemnity 
paid to producers in a given county divided by total crop insurance liability.  Actuarial 
documentation also shows that a number of additional adjustments are used to spread risk 
across farms (see Josephson et al.).  The exponent is always negative ( 0<e ) so that the 
base premium rate declines as the rate yield rises relative to the reference yield.  A 
number of other adjustments related to high risk areas, special additional coverage, and 
other factors can also be made when calculating a farm-specific premium rate (see RMA 
2000a and RMA 2000b, for more information).  
 Critics have argued that inter-farm variation in yield loss risk cannot be accurately 
assessed by looking only at differences in average yield.  Skees and Reed argued that 
even if there is a general, statistically significant relationship between average yield and 
expected indemnity, heterogeneity in yield loss risk among farms with the same average 
yield can lead to asymmetric information problems and adverse selection.  
Other researchers have reached similar conclusions. In a study of the relationship 
between the mean and variability of crop yields, Goodwin found little evidence to suggest 
                                                 
1 The RMA rate yield is essential the mean yield for a producers production history.  . 
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that yield losses are related to yield means and argued that premiums rated without farm-
specific information on yield variability will not be correct.  Vandeveer and Loehman 
found that yield loss risk (expected indemnity) varies significantly among farms with the 
same average yield and that crop insurance participants are likely to have a positive 
expected net return to crop insurance purchase.  Just et al. used survey data on producers’ 
subjective yield expectations to show that positive expected return is a key motivation for 
producers who purchase crop insurance and that negative return is a key barrier to 
producers who do not purchase insurance.  They suggest that the lack of a suitable farm-
specific measure of yield variability is at least part of the problem. Makki and Somwaru 
find that producer insurance purchase decisions are driven in part by the number of years 
in which yields (from crop insurance yield histories) have fallen below guarantee levels.  
Using a technique developed by Chiappori and Salanie, they find evidence of asymmetric 
information in corn and soybean insurance contracts in Iowa. 
In theory, an actuarially fair premium rate is equal to the expected loss per dollar 
of crop insurance liability given a specific coverage level jθ , which I denote as )( θjLE .  















)( .  In practical terms, 
of course, expected loss can only be estimated as the loss-cost ratio over a period of 
years: )()( 1 j
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jtjjj LNL θθ ∑−= , where )( jjtL θ is the ratio of indemnity to insurance 
liability on farm j in year t,   The farm-specific ratio of indemnity to liability is defined 
as: 

























where tp  is output price, jθ is the coverage level expressed as a proportion (for 75% 
coverage θ =.75), jy
~ is the RMA rate yield, jty  is the actual yield, and Z(.) is an indictor 
function with value one when
jtjj yy >
~θ , zero otherwise.  Because farm-specific yield 
histories contain 10 or fewer yield observations, the real question is whether a farm-
specific loss-cost ratio, which may be subject to substantial sampling error, comes closer 
to the theoretically correct premium rate than the RMA premium rate (once the farm-
specific rate is adjusted for disaster reserves and prevented planting). 
 
This Study 
In this study, I develop (1) an econometric model of asymmetric information in 
crop insurance and (2) a simulation model to compare existing RMA premium rates to an 
alternative rating method that uses existing yield history data to incorporate farm-level 
information on yield loss risk.  I apply both models to crop/region combinations where 
yield loss risk is low (non-irrigated corn in a portion of the Corn Belt region) and where 
yield loss risk is relatively high (continuously cropped non-irrigated wheat in a portion of 
the Northern Plains).  With these models, I provide some insight on the role of RMA 
rating methods in regional differences in underwriting losses.  I also assess the potential 
for using farm-specific data on yield loss risk in premium rating.  Although there is little 
hope of accurately rating premiums for individual farms, it may be possible to reduce 
overall premium rating error on a broader scale (e.g., county or region), possibly reducing 
overall underwriting losses.  
Chapter 2 provides a foundation for Chapters 3 and 4 by exploring crop insurance 
yield history data.  I develop a model that identifies systematic variation in crop yields 
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across producers and across time.  I use the model to isolate farm-specific random yield 
variations and test the fit of several common distributions.  Based on the results of this 
analysis, I develop a yield simulation model that underlies the simulation analysis in 
Chapter 4.     
In Chapter 3, I build on the approach suggested by Chiappori and Salanie to (1) 
identify and quantify the effects of asymmetric information on the choice of crop 
insurance coverage level and returns to crop insurance purchase and (2) compare and 
contrast these asymmetric information effects on areas with relatively high yield loss risk 
(wheat in the Northern Plains) and relatively low yield risk (corn in the Corn Belt).  
While regional differences in the actuarial performance have been identified as an issue 
for the crop insurance program (Glauber), most existing research is limited in scope.  For 
example, Just et al. use survey data on corn and soybean producers. Makki and Somwaru 
used data on corn and soybeans in Iowa. Vandeveer and Lohman studied corn producers 
in a single county in Indiana.   
In Chapter 4, I explore the potential of alternate methods for rating yield loss risk.  
While it is important to identify and quantify the effects of asymmetric information, the 
real question is whether the information asymmetry can be reduced.  In particular, can 
premium rating be improved using only the yield histories already maintained by RMA?  
Existing evidence appears to be mixed. On one hand, premium rating problems are 
pervasive enough to have been identified through empirical analysis which, in some 
cases, is based on crop insurance contract and yield history data (Makki and Somwaru).  
Persistent underwriting losses in some areas and the need for high premium subsidies to 
encourage broad participation also tend to support the notion that premium rating can be 
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improved to reduce underwriting losses. On the other hand, crop insurance yield histories 
– which include, at most, 10 observations – are not sufficient to establish field-specific, 
actuarially fair premiums with a reasonable level of statistical confidence.  Collecting 
additional data, moreover, is unlikely to solve the problem. Because 10 years already 
accounts for 20-25 percent of a farmer’s working lifetime, collecting a longer time-series 
on individual fields would be impractical.  
I develop a simulation model to test the hypothesis that using farm-specific yield 
histories to rate premiums – despite the uncertainties associated with small samples – 
could, on average, reduce overall deviation of premium rates from actuarial fair rates.  
“On average” means that premiums would be closer to actuarially fair for many or most 
farms while acknowledging that data limitations make accurate farm-specific premium 
rating impossible.  To sort out the actuarial gains and losses from use of a farm-specific 
measure of yield variability, I focus on two sources of premium rating error.  Premiums 
rated without the benefit of farm-specific information on yield variability may be in error 
because the rating model is only an approximation to the theoretically correct model.  I 
refer to this type of error as “modeling error.”  On the other hand, premiums based on a 
theoretically correct model that includes a measure of farm-specific yield variability are 
subject to error because of sampling error in yield variability measures calculated from 
small samples. My simulation model, based on actual crop insurance yield history data, 
provides estimates of the relative size of modeling error in RMA premium rates and 
sampling error in alternative premium rates developed from a theoretically correct model. 
Finally, I use the crop insurance yield data and the yield models to estimate the 
effect of aggregation on the representation of both systematic and random yield variation. 
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The effect of aggregation is important because a great deal of readily available 
agricultural data are aggregated to the county level.  Disaggregated data, even when they 
do exist, can be difficult to obtain.  For example, agricultural census data aggregated to 
the county level are readily available while use of underlying farm-specific data are 
restricted due to producer confidentiality concerns.  Estimates of yield variation lost to 
aggregation of yield data from crop insurance units to the farm, county, and regional level 
may provide insight on the loss of variability when working with aggregated yield data 
from other sources.  
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Chapter 2:  Crop Insurance Yields:  Heterogeneity and Distribution 
 
Representing heterogeneity in agricultural economics research and accounting for 
that heterogeneity in policy development are ongoing challenges.  The importance of 
heterogeneity and problems associated with spatial and temporal aggregation have been 
addressed by numerous authors (e.g., Gardner and Kramer (1986), Just and Pope (1999)).  
In many agricultural settings, a key component of overall heterogeneity is the variability 
of crop yields.  Both spatial and temporal dimensions of yield variability may be 
important in determining land use, cropping patterns, farm program participation, and 
crop insurance purchase decisions. The debate over yield distributions has spawned a 
large literature, including a number of articles that focus on methods of separating the 
systematic and random components of crop yields (e.g., see Just and Weninger (1999); 
Atwood et. al. (2002)).   
In this Chapter, I develop crop yield models for non-irrigated corn in the Corn 
Belt, where yield risk is relatively low, and for continuously cropped, non-irrigated wheat 
in the Northern Plains, where yield risk is considerably higher.  Using regression 
techniques, I develop fixed-effect models, possibly with time trends, designed to separate 
yield variation into systematic and random components.  Model outputs are used to 
analyze the effect of aggregation on the representation of both systematic and random 
components of yield variation.  I also test farm-specific random yield variation against 
three common distributions: normal, beta, and gamma (two versions of the gamma 
distribution are used); each of which has been advanced in a previous study as a 
candidate for describing random variation in crop yields.  In Chapter 4, the yield models 
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are used to simulate the potential for improving crop insurance premium rating using 
farm-specific information on yield variability. 
 
Data 
Yield data are obtained from Risk Management Agency (RMA) crop insurance 
yield histories for 2001, which include (at most) yield data for 1991-2000.  Yield history 
data are for crop insurance “units.”  A crop insurance unit can encompass a single field or 
an entire farm depending on the physical location of fields, their ownership, and the 
preferences of individual producers. Many farms include more than one crop insurance 
unit.  The crop insurance yield histories reflect average annual yields for acreage planted 
to a given crop within the crop insurance unit.  If fewer than 4 actual yield observations 
are available, local “transitional” yields are included to ensure that 4 yield “observations” 
are present in each yield history.  For the purpose of this study, yield observations were 
considered valid only if yields and acreages are reported as "actual” (i.e., transitional 
yields are excluded).    
For corn in the Corn Belt, data from 69 central and northern Illinois counties were 
selected.  The study area includes counties that lie within Major Land Resource Areas 
(MLRA; USDA-SCS) 108, 111, and 115.  For wheat in the Northern Plains, yield 
histories from 36 counties in North Dakota and South Dakota are included.  These 
counties are part of MLRA 53A, 53B, 53C, 54, 55A, 55B, 55C, or 56. 
Because of premium subsidy increases in 1995 and again in 1999-2000, the 
number of farms purchasing crop insurance has increased over time.  Some producers – 
perhaps those with relatively low expected return to crop insurance or relatively low risk 
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premiums – began purchasing crop insurance after one or both of the subsidy increases.  
Because the number of acres covered by crop insurance increased substantially between 
1991 and 2000, many crop insurance units have yield histories of less than 10 years.  As 
such, the data offers both challenges and opportunities. If farmers who insured only after 
1995 differ from those with a longer crop insurance history, time trend parameters may 
reflect differences in “old” and “new” crop insurance participants rather than yield 
changes due to changes in production technology.  On the other hand, if these more 
recent participants have lower risk of yield loss, the subsidy increase and subsequent 
increase in participation may hold evidence of asymmetric information. To inform the 
analyses planned for Chapters 3 and 4, I specify models for two datasets:  One includes 
crop insurance units with 8 or more observations while the other includes units with 4 or 
more observations from 1995 or later.  In the latter, pre-1995 data are excluded to ensure 
that a particularly good or bad year is not included in the data for some farms but not 
others (in the Corn Belt, for example, 1993 was a bad year because of extensive and 
prolonged flooding).  
Before proceeding, I consider the possibility of outliers.  There is no reason to 
believe that a low (or even zero) yield is an unreasonable outcome.  During the period 
over which the data were collected, natural events (such as flooding and drought) resulted 
in widespread crop failure. Yields that are much higher than the large majority of yields 
within the same county in a given year, however, may be due to either particularly 
unusual conditions or erroneous reporting. In the Corn Belt, for example, some annual 
yield observations exceed 300 bushels per acre. 
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To identify observations that could be outliers, I used a standard “box plot” 
definition.  An observation is identified as a potential outlier 
when )(5.1 25,75,75, ktktktijkt qqqy −+> , where ijkty  is the yield for unit i, on farm j, in county 
k, at time t and 75,ktq  and 25,ktq  are the 75
th and 25th percentiles, respectively, for county k 
at time t.  In the time-series (with 8-10 observations per crop insurance unit), for 
example, this procedure identified 1,431 observations as potential outliers for corn in the 
Corn Belt and 1,258 for wheat in the Northern Plains.  Because so many observations 
were identified, individual inspection was not possible.  Because the number was small 
relative to the total size of the dataset, however, I elected to remove them all.  When these 
observations were removed, some crop yield histories fell below the minimum length (4 
or 8 years, depending on the dataset) and were entirely removed.  For the long time-series 
of corn yields in the Corn Belt, I removed a total 3,215 observations, or about 0.6 percent 
(Table 2.1).  In the Northern Plains, 4,233 wheat yields were removed from the long 
time-series data, about 1.7 percent.  A smaller number of observations were removed 
from the short time-series datasets (with 4-6 observations per crop insurance unit).  
Descriptive statistics on the final datasets are given in Table 2.2. 
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Table 2.1. Number of Observations, Farms, and Crop Insurance Units by Region and Crop  
              Outliers 
  Observations %Obs. Farms %Farms Units %Units Removed 
Corn Belt Corn 
All Observations 729,699 100 45,758 100 101,474 100 1,431 
Long Time-Series 
(8-10 obs.)  531,279 73 29,350 64 55,982 55 3,215 
Short Time Series 
(4-6 obs.)  454,517 62 42,500 93 86,833 86 1,251 
        
Northern Plains Wheat 
All Observations 489,037 100 19,461 100 86,247 100 1,080 
Long Time-Series 
(8-10 obs.)  244,481 50 10,154 52 26,984 31 4,233 
Short Time-Series 
(4-6 obs.)  256,863 53 15,921 82 62,061 72 1,282 
 
Table 2.2. Descriptive Statistics     
  Observations Mean 
Standard 
Deviation Minimum Maximum 
Corn Belt Corn 
Long Time-
Series (8-10 
obs.)  528,064 144.6 33.1 0 245 
Short Time-
Series (4-6 obs.)  453,266 142.5 31.0 0 245 
      
Northern Plains Wheat 
Long Time-
Series (8-10 
obs.)  240,248 35.4 13.9 0 91 
Short Time-
Series (4-6 obs.)  255,581 34.9 13.8 0 89 
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Initial Yield Models 
Yield models are intended to capture systematic variation in yields that could be 
reasonably anticipated by a government agency attempting to isolate the random 
variation in the error term.  The appropriate method of identifying these systematic 
components, however, has been controversial.  Just and Weninger (1999) emphasize 
econometric estimation of a flexible polynomial time trend that captures field-specific, 
possibly non-linear, trends.  Atwood et al. present Monte Carlo evidence suggesting the 
procedure used by Just and Weninger tends to bias tests in a type II direction (failing to 
reject the null hypothesis when it is not true) because residuals from averaging or 
regression models tend to be “supernormal” or “normalized.”  They advocate using 
annual average yields within an area (e.g., region or county) to define the systematic 
component of crop yields, specifically rejecting the use of time trends, but acknowledge 
that the presence of a time trend in yields would invalidate their procedure. 
In this study, I take a somewhat different approach. Like Just and Weninger, my 
initial model (the starting point for estimation) includes an econometrically estimated 
time trend albeit a far simpler one than employed by Just and Weninger.  Linear and non-
linear time terms are included but only at the region level to account for widespread 
changes in technology that tend to make higher yields more profitable.  I do not use unit-, 
farm-, and county-specific time trends because they can be strongly influenced by 
particularly low or high yields at the beginning or end of a short time-series.     
I do not use the Atwood et al. approach because the ex post use of annual county 
average yields assumes that government agencies or others can accurately predict county-
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average yields. The use of county averages to account for year-to-year variation 
implicitly assigns county-level random variation to the deterministic portion of the 
model.2  The use of a time trend acknowledges that county yields cannot be accurately 
predicted and should be considered as part of random yield variation. 
Initial models provide a starting point for model specification.  The initial models 
are selected to be general enough to capture all potentially reasonable effects.  The initial 
mean model is specified as:  












ijkt dddtfty εββββββ ++++++= )(0  
where: 










m βββββ and miβ are parameters (superscript m indicates mean model); 
)(tf  is a non-linear function of time (defined below); 
kd  =1 for county k, =0 otherwise; 
jd =1 for farm j, =0 otherwise; 
id =1 for unit i, =0 otherwise; and, 
ijktε  is an idiosyncratic error term. 
Note that subscripts i, j, and k refer to unit-, farm-, and county-specific effects 
respectively.  When only one subscript appears, the variable includes only variation 
specific to that level of the model.  When the subscripts ijk appear together, the variable 
represents variation from all three levels.    
                                                 
2 This approach is appropriate to the purposes of the Atwood et al. study as they are interested primarily in 
the distribution of purely random, farm-level errors.  Later in this Chapter, before testing random yield 
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Assuming no serial correlation, squared residuals from equation (1) are the 
dependent variables in the variance model. The initial variance model is: 












=  ; 
ijktε̂  is the residual from the mean model; 








v ββββ and viβ are parameters (superscript v indicates variance model); and 
ijktυ  is an idiosyncratic error term.  
 
Hypothesis Testing  
I use statistical tests to determine whether parameters representing individual 
mean and variance model effects are significantly different from zero.  Because model 
effects often involve multiple parameters, tests are based on F-statistics.  The spatial 
effect of crop insurance units, for example, would include a dummy variable for each 
crop insurance unit in the sample.  Formally, the null hypothesis in the unit-effect test is 
IiH mi ∈∀= 0:0 β  against the alternative IioneleastatforH
m
iA ∈≠ 0: β  where I is 
the set of all crop insurance units in the sample.   
F-statistics are calculated from the model and residual sum of squares for 
unrestricted and restricted regressions. In the unit-effect example, the unrestricted model 
                                                                                                                                                 
errors against various parametric distributions, I use a similar adjustment to remove correlation among 
farms.   
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is estimated without restricting the unit-specific parameters while the restricted model is 
estimated with these parameters restricted to equal zero.  Note that equations 2.1 and 2.2 
are the most general models that I consider but are not necessarily the “unrestricted 
model” in a specific hypothesis test.  As hypothesis testing proceeds, the unrestricted 
model in a specific test may contain parameter restrictions relative to equations 2.1 and 
2.2.   
Statistical tests are used to specify the final mean and variance models.  For the 
time specification, I test the significance of several non-linear specifications (i.e., forms 
for the function, )(tf ), as well as a linear time term.  For spatial effects, nested tests of 
the significance of unit, farm, and county effects are used.  The specific sequence of tests 
and interpretation of results are discussed in the next section. Details of specific mean 
model hypothesis tests are given in Appendix 2.1. Mean model effect tests are carried out 
on heteroskedasticity-corrected models.  Thus, testing of variance model effects and 
variance model specification decisions are nested within the mean model tests.  Details of 
specific variance model hypothesis tests are given in Appendix 2.2.     
Calculation of the F-statistic for a specific parameter restriction in the mean 
model, therefore, involves several steps:   
• The unrestricted mean model without heteroskedasticity correction is estimated to 
obtain predicted values and residuals that are used to specify the dependent 
variable in the variance model; 
• The specification of independent variables in the variance model is determined by 
decision criteria based on a sequence of F-tests;  
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• Restricted and unrestricted mean models with heteroskedasticity corrections are 
estimated and the F-statistic is calculated from the model and residual sum of 
squares. 
 
Because the dataset is very large, however, pre-set limitations in statistical 
software preclude the estimation of a single regression equation that includes all 
observations.  The GLM procedure in SAS accommodates up to 32,000 fixed effects.  
The regional models easily exceed this preset limit when county, farm, unit, and time 
effects are included. In the Corn Belt, for example, there are more than 55,000 crop 
insurance units and more than 29,000 farms.  Thus, a single F-statistic for a region-wide 
hypothesis (e.g., all unit-effect parameters are equal to zero) cannot be calculated.  To 
accommodate the data, I divided them into 100 groups by placing each individual farm 
(with all associated crop insurance units) into one of the groups at random. Thus, the test 
procedure already described produces 100 F-statistics and associated p-values for each 
hypothesis test. To reach a well-defined conclusion, group-specific tests must be 
combined to form a single hypothesis test. Even if the null hypothesis is true, odds are 
that some of the 100 test statistics will lay in the critical region defined with a given 
significance level. Given that the null hypothesis is true, for example, one would expect 
roughly 5 percent of the data groups to produce test statistics with p-values between 0 
and 0.05.  If the null hypothesis is rejected when any 1 of the 100 p-values is in the range 
0 to 0.05, then the size of the test, i.e., the probability of rejecting the null hypothesis 
when it is true, is 10095.01− , which is much greater than 0.05. 
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A typical solution is to reduce the size of the critical region and reject the null 
hypothesis when any one test statistic falls in this reduced-size critical region (Hsu). A 
simple and well-known approach is to reduce the size of the critical region for any 1 test 
statistic to testN/1)1(1* αα −−=  where testN  is the number of tests.  For 05.0=α  and 
n=100, the size of the reduced critical region would be 00051.0* =α .  A problem with 
this approach in the case of survey data is that the test is highly vulnerable to the presence 
of a few anomalous outliers.  Correcting the size of the test in this way leads to rejecting 
the null hypothesis when only 1 of the 100 F-statistics falls in the critical region.  As a 
result, if there are anomalies unique to a single group, then rejection may occur because 
of otherwise undetected errors in the data.  Any test procedure in which results can be 
driven by only a small fraction of the data is potentially vulnerable to this testing bias. 
An alternate solution is to develop a procedure that uses all 100 of the test 
statistics (and all of the data) rather than determining the test statistic based on the most 
extreme value (in this case the most extreme one percent of the data). One option is to use 
the average p-value (which I denote as pval ) as an overall test statistic.  Each p-value is 
the result of a transformation that maps the F-statistic (or any test statistic) to a uniform 
distribution bounded by 0 and 1. An F-statistic that maps into a p-value of 0.05 indicates 
that the probability of observing an F-static at least as large is 0.05, given that the null 
hypothesis is true. Assuming that the individual p-values are independently and 
identically distributed, the distribution of pval can be approximated via the Central Limit 
Theorem (the Lindberg-Levy variant for a univariate distribution, see Greene p. 122).   
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Given that the underlying population of 100 p-values has a standard uniform 
distribution (e.g., a uniform distribution bounded by 0 and 1), the underlying population 
mean and variance are pvalu  = 0.5 and 
2

















is approximately normally distributed.  The degree of approximation is highly accurate 
with 100 observations as can be verified by Monte Carlo methods.  For the standard 
normal distribution, 645.1)05.0(1 −=Φ − , where Φ is the standard normal CDF.  To 
check the approximation, 100,000 sets of 100 values where drawn from the standard 
uniform distribution and the average was calculated for each set.  The 5th percentile of 
these 100,000 average values is -1.643.   
Hypothesis testing proceeds as follows:  A null hypothesis is rejected when pval  
falls into the critical region, defined as the lower 5 percent of the probability mass of 
pval .  A single-tailed test using the lower tail is appropriate because low p-values, by 
definition, indicate extreme values of the underlying test statistic (an F-statistic in this 
case), even for test statistics that could produce extreme values at either end of their 
distribution (e.g., a t-statistic can produce extreme values that are negative or positive 


















 where Φ is the standard normal CDF and α = 0.05.  
Alternately, the critical value of pval associated with any given α is 
( )
pvalpval un +Φ
− )(1 ασ  and the hypothesis is rejected 
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when ( ) pvalpval unpval +Φ< − )(1 ασ .  For α = 0.05, the critical value of pval is equal to 
4525.5.0)05.0(02886.0 1 =+Φ − .  This critical value is used throughout the next section 
to determine the statistical significance of specific model effects. 
 
Estimation Results 
Table 2.3 gives selected estimation results for the Corn Belt corn model using 
only crop insurance units with 8 or more yield observations.  In the top portion of the 
table (Time Effect Specification Test Results), each numbered row represents a test related 
to the model time effect.  Each of the four models reported in the top section of Table 2.3 
includes spatial effects for county, farm, and crop insurance unit.  The bottom portion 
(Spatial Effect Specification Test Results) reports test results for sequential tests of model 
spatial effects (unit, farm, and county), given the time specification selected base on 
statistical and other evidence.  For all seven tests, the average marginal effect of time and 
the 1st, 10th, 50th, and 90th, and 99th percentiles of the marginal effect (in the unrestricted 


















1 10 25 50 75 90 99
1 <0.0001 0.6173 <0.0001 <0.0001 0.0024 -0.34 -2.60 -1.62 -0.91 -0.22 0.35 0.71 1.16
2 <0.0001 0.6267 <0.0001 <0.0001 0.2227 1.47 0.27 0.75 0.98 1.25 1.62 2.53 4.99
3 <0.0001 0.6351 <0.0001 <0.0001 0.0005 2.10 -0.29 0.15 0.41 0.92 2.29 5.12 14.06
4 <0.0001 0.6344 <0.0001 <0.0001 0.0000 1.31 0.99 1.09 1.16 1.29 1.40 1.57 1.70









1 10 25 50 75 90 99
5 <0.0001 0.6266 0.0001 <0.0001 0.0119 1.31 0.99 1.09 1.16 1.29 1.40 1.57 1.70
6 <0.0001 0.9834 <0.0001 <0.0001 <0.0001 1.31 0.99 1.10 1.20 1.30 1.39 1.56 1.71
7 <0.0001 0.9294 0.0063 <0.0001 <0.0001 1.32 0.98 1.09 1.20 1.31 1.42 1.58 1.76
*All specifications include a linear time term.
Table 2.3.  Specification Test Results for Corn Belt Corn--Long Time Series
Test
Mean Model Test Results
Average p -values
Variance Model Test Results Marginal Effect of Time (Unrestricted Model)
Percentiles
Time Effect Specification Test Results















Marginal Effect of Time (Unrestricted Model)
Average p -
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 For corn in the Corn Belt, consider mean model test results, beginning with time 
effects.  Each of the non-linear time terms tested is statistically significant at the 5 percent 
level.  The average p-values associated with the relevant F-tests are less than 0.4525 for 
Tests 1-4 so the null hypothesis that associated parameters are equal to zero can be 
rejected. The sign and magnitude of the marginal effect of time in these models, however, 
is problematic. With the time-squared term in the model, for example, the marginal effect 
of time is negative for more than half of all observations.  Because crop yields have 
generally been rising over time, the presence of a negative marginal effect likely indicates 
the presence of particularly large yields early in the time-series or particularly low yields 
late in the time-series.  Because the time-series is short, these observations can exert a 
substantial influence.3  
When the logarithm of time is included (in place of the time-squared term), the 
magnitude of the marginal effect varies from 0.27 to about 5 bushels per acre per year 
(bu/a/yr), although 90 percent of the marginal effects are 2.5 bu/a/yr or less.  A marginal 
effect of 2.5 bu/a/yr implies that expected yield would increase 25 bushel per acre over a 
10 year period. Given rapid advances in corn seed technology, such rapid yield increases 
seem possible but still dramatic.  With the log-log term in the model, the range of time 
marginal effects is even larger, ranging from less than zero to more than 14 bu/a/yr.  Ten 
percent of observations have marginal effect of 5 bu/a/yr, implying a ten-year increase in 
expected corn yields of 50 bushels per acre.  The average marginal effect in the log-log 
case is more than 2 bu/a/yr.   
                                                 
3 A change in economic conditions (e.g., lower input prices or higher input prices) could prompt producers 
to plan lower yields by using fewer inputs.  Technical change, however, has generally caused increasing 
yields over the past 50 years, even as the real prices of agricultural commodities have declined.   
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The linear time term, absent non-linear time terms, is also significant at the 5 
percent level (the null hypothesis that the time term parameter is equal to zero can be 
rejected as the average p-value of 0.0064 is less than 0.4525).  With a linear time term 
only, the marginal effect of time appears to be more realistic, ranging between 1 and 1.7 
bu/a/yr, with an average value of about 1.3.  I adopt this specification for the time 
component and use it in testing spatial effects.   
Results of spatial effect tests for the Corn Belt corn model are reported in the 
bottom section of Table 2.3.  For the mean model, all three spatial effects (unit, farm, and 
county) are retained.  Based on average p-values reported in the bottom section of Table 
2.3, the null hypotheses that unit, farm, and county-effect parameters are equal to zero, 
respectively, are rejected. Average p-values are well below the critical value of 0.4525 in 
all three tests. 
Finally, the variance model specification is the one implied by the variance model 
test results for mean model Test 5.  Given the critical value of 0.4525, the null hypothesis 
that parameter estimates are equal to zero is rejected for the time trend, farm, and county 
effects while the null hypothesis that the unit effect is zero is not rejected in any of the 
models.  Because I have no prior expectation about the sign or size of any of these 
effects, these test results were used to select the variance model.  Thus, the variance 
model includes a time trend, farm, and county effect for each of the unrestricted models.   











1 10 25 50 75 90 99
1 0.24081 0.49658 0.00037 2E-112 3.2598E-10 -2.6677 -5 -4.1 -3.5 -2.6 -1.8 -1.3 -0.8
2 0.25204 0.523 0.00019 4E-111 1.4765E-08 -0.9268 -7.8 -4.2 -1.8 -0.1 0.69 1.14 1.78
3 0.26714 0.58339 0.00013 1E-103 1.8469E-06 -1.1329 -11 -4.1 -1.3 -0.1 0.36 0.65 1.12
4 0.26393 0.60429 7.6E-05 6E-106 0.00644367 -0.4223 -0.7 -0.6 -0.5 -0.4 -0.3 -0.3 -0.1









1 10 25 50 75 90 99
5 0.24245 0.34429 0.02996 4.1E-28 0.9668 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
6 0.21261 0.98442 9.3E-07 1.7E-55 0.0000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
7 0.33704 0.98663 0.00094 4E-108 0.0000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
*Specifications do not include time terms.
Percentiles
Mean
Marginal Effect of Time (Unrestricted Model)
Average p -
value
Spatial Effect Specification Test Results
MeanTest








Table 2.3B.  Specification Test Results for Northern Plains Wheat--Long Time Series
Test
Mean Model Test Results
Average p -values
Variance Model Test Results Marginal Effect of Time (Unrestricted Model)
Percentiles
Time Effect Specification Test Results










































 For wheat in the Northern Plains, specification test results for the long time-series 
are given in Table 2.4.  The set of tests is the same as in the Corn Belt corn model. The 
mean model tests for the non-linear time terms (Tests 1-3 in Table 2.4) show that each 
term is significant at (at least) the 5 percent level on the basis of average p-values. The 
marginal effect of time, however, would be negative for more than one-half of 
observation for each of the three unrestricted models (Tests 1-3).  Test results for the 
linear time term (Test 4 in Table 2.4) are similar.  While the average p-value associated 
with restricting the linear time-term parameter to zero is well under the 5 percent critical 
value, the marginal effect of time is negative for more than one-half of all observations.  
Given these results, time effects are excluded from the mean model. 
 Spatial effect specification test results, reported at the bottom of Table 2.4, are 
based on models that do not include time effects.  The average p-values show that the 
unit effect parameters are not significantly different from zero and the unit effect is 
deleted from the model.  The farm and county effects are significant and are retained in 
the model.   
 Finally the short time-series models are specified using the long time-series time 
effects as a starting point.  For Corn Belt corn the initial time component is a simple, 
linear time trend.  For Northern Plains wheat time effects are excluded from the initial 
model for the short time-series.  Specification test results are shown in Tables 2.5 (Corn 
Belt corn) and 2.6 (Northern Plains wheat).   
For the Corn Belt, the average p-value is low enough to reject the null hypothesis 
that the time trend variable parameter is equal to zero, but the marginal effect of time is 
very large for this specification (Test Model 1 in Table 2.5), implying an average increase 
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in corn yields of 5.6 bushels per year.  Over a 10-year period, that would imply corn yield 
increases of more than 56 bushels per acre – an ultimately unbelievable rise in corn 
yields.  Because of the shortness of the time-series, the time parameter will be quite 
sensitive to high or low yields at the beginning or end of the time-series.  I conclude that 
the data are not sufficient to estimate a time trend.   
Spatially, the unit, farm, and county effects are all retained as the null hypothesis 
that all parameters associated with a given effect are all equal to zero, can be rejected on 
the basis of average p-values for both the Corn Belt corn model (Table 2.5, Test Models 
2, 3, and 4) and the Northern Plains (Table 2.6, Test Models 2, 3, and 4).  In the Northern 
Plains wheat model, the unit effect is retained in the short time-series model even though 
it was not retained in the long time-series model.  That may be due to broader cross-
sectional coverage of crop insurance units in the short time-series model. 
Variance model specifications can be inferred from the variance model 
specification tests associated with Test Model 2 in Table 2.5 for Corn Belt corn and Test 
Model 1 in Table 2.6 for Northern Plains wheat.  In both cases the final variance models 
include a linear time trend and spatial effects for unit, farm, and county.  










1 10 25 50 75 90 99
1 0.0003 0.0453 0.0008 0.0000 0.0000 5.668 5.360 5.511 5.667 5.779 6.000









1 10 25 50 75 90 99
2 0.0853 0.1343 0.0402 0.0178 0.0029 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
3 0.1048 0.9009 0.0000 0.0014 0.0000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
4 0.1997 0.8548 0.0016 0.0000 0.0000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
*Specifications do not include time terms.
Percentiles
Mean
Marginal Effect of Time (Unrestricted Model)
Average p -
value
Spatial Effect Specification Test Results
MeanTest








Table 2.5.  Specification Test Results for Corn Belt Corn--Short Time Series
Test
Mean Model Test Results
Average p -values
Variance Model Test Results Marginal Effect of Time (Unrestricted Model)
Percentiles
Time Effect Specification Test Results











































1 10 25 50 75 90 99
2 0.2437 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.1548 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
3 0.0128 0.8125 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
4 0.0011 0.9716 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
*Specifications do not include time terms.
Spatial Effect Specification Test Results
Mean
Table 2.6.  Specification Test Results for Northern Plains Wheat--Short Time Series
Test































The Effect of Aggregation on the Representation of Crop Yield Variation 
Much of the agricultural data available for economic research is aggregated to the 
county level.  For example, a wide range of county aggregate data on production, land 
use, non-land farm input use, farm returns, and producer demographics is readily 
available to researchers through the agriculture census.  The farm-specific data 
underlying county aggregates, however, can be used only under limited conditions to 
protect the confidentiality of producers who provide data.  Likewise, annual estimates of 
acreage, crop production, livestock production, and other agricultural indicators are 
available by county but not at the farm or field level. 
The use of county average yields will mask yield variation as idiosyncratic 
variation at the field- and farm-level is averaged out.  To quantify the effect of 
aggregation on both systematic and random variation in crop yields within a single, 
consistent framework, I start with a basic yield model: 
(2.3)     
ijktijktijkt yy ε+= ˆ  
Where 
ijkty  is the yield for unit i, on farm j, in county k, at time t; 
ijktŷ  is the expected yield; and  
ijktε  is the idiosyncratic yield error. 
 
To develop a region-wide measure of yield variability that contains both 
systematic and random components, I subtract the region-average yield (averaged over 
both time and space) from both sides of (2.3) and square both sides: 
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(2.4)        ))(ˆ(2)()ˆ()( 222 ijktijktijktijktijkt yyyyyy εε −++−=−  
where ∑∑∑∑−=
i j k t
ijktijkt yaay
1 and a is total acreage for the crop/region combination.  
My measure of total, region-wide yield variation, calculated from the crop insurance unit-
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ε    
The LHS is an acre-weighted average of the total squared variation of unit-specific yields 
from a region-wide average yield. The first term on the RHS is a similar measure that 
represents systematic variation across farms. The second RHS term is a measure of total 
random variation – yield variance – represented by the crop insurance data.  The last term 
is the interaction between systematic and random yield variation (which should be zero if 
systematic and random components have been successfully separated).   
I consider the effect of three separate aggregations. The expected yield and 
residual are averaged across (1) crop insurance units within farms, (2) across all farms 
within a county, and (3) all counties within the region.  Total yield variability, systematic 
variability, and random variability components are calculated at each level of 
aggregation.  For example, averaging across crop insurance units (aggregating to the farm 

































ijktjkt aa , ∑=
i
ijktijktjkt yay , and ∑=
i
ijktijktjkt a εε .  In this example, the yield, 
expected yield, and yield error are summed to the farm level before calculating the yield 
variability measure. The variability measures for other spatial aggregations are similarly 
derived.   
 To make the variability estimates comparable across regions and crops, I divide 
through by the squared region-average yield.  To make the numbers easier to read, I 
multiply each by 100.  I refer to these measures as “standardized variations.”   These 
measures for the Corn Belt corn data and Northern Plains wheat data can be found in 
Tables 2.7 and 2.8, respectively. 
For corn in the Corn Belt, using crop insurance units with 8 or more years of data, 
65 percent of total standardized yield variation ((3.13/4.83)*100) is from the random 
component.  When data are aggregated to the farm level, total variation declines by about 
9 percent (4.83 to 4.40).  Systematic and random components each decline by about the 
same percentage. When yields are aggregated to the county level total variation declines 
by 55 percent (from 4.83 to 2.16).  About 73 percent of the systematic component and 47 
percent of the random component are lost. 
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Table 2.7. Effect of Aggregation on the Representation of Crop Yield Variation--
Corn Belt Corn 





Aggregated Farms Counties Region 
 Standardized Variations 
Total 4.83 4.40 2.16 1.19 
Systematic 1.68 1.52 0.45 0.06 
Random 3.13 2.82 1.66 1.12 
Interaction 0.03 0.05 0.06 0.00 




 528,064 306,468 690 10 
      
 Standardized Variations 
Total 4.21 3.63 1.37 0.62 
Systematic 1.89 1.63 0.42 0.00 
Random 2.31 1.94 0.88 0.57 
Interaction 0.01 0.06 0.06 0.05 




  453,266 237,679 414 6 
 
Using data for 1995-2001 (the short time-series), total variation declines by about 
13 percent (from 4.83 with the longer time-series to 4.21 with the shorter).  Systematic 
variation is larger than with the longer time-series while random variation is sharply 
decreased.  These differences are likely explained by the broadening of the dataset to 
include a larger set of crop insurance units, which could account for larger systematic 
variation, and the shorter time-series, which could account for the reduction in random 
variation. Larger random variation in the long time-series model may reflect the effect of 
massive Midwest flooding in 1993, which is included in the longer time-series but not the 
shorter time-series.  
When Corn Belt data are aggregated to the farm-level, loss of total yield variation 
for the short time-series is about 14 percent.  Systematic and random variations are 
reduced by 14 and 16 percent, respectively.  When aggregated to the county level, total 
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variation, systematic variation, and random variation are reduced by 68, 78, and 62 
percent, respectively.  The loss of yield variation is also large for all components when 
data are aggregated from the county to the region level.  
Table 2.8. Effect of Aggregation on the Representation of Crop Yield Variation--
Northern Plains Wheat 





Aggregated Farms Counties Region 
  Standardized Variations 
Total 14.56 12.91 6.66 3.34 
Systematic 3.71 3.71 1.55 0.01 
Random 11.22 9.57 5.33 3.42 
Interaction -0.36 -0.36 -0.22 -0.10 




 240,248 95,736 474 10 
      
  Standardized Variations 
Total 14.25 11.73 5.17 1.42 
Systematic 6.95 5.97 2.62 0.04 
Random 7.40 5.36 2.04 1.19 
Interaction -0.10 0.41 0.51 0.20 




  255,581 81,025 306 6 
 
The measures of standardized variation calculated for Northern Plains wheat are 
roughly three times those for Corn Belt corn (Table 2.7).  For example, total variation in 
the long time-series models are 14.56 and 4.83 for Northern Plains wheat and Corn Belt 
corn, respectively.  Random variation also makes up a larger share of total variation in 
the Northern Plains.  For the long time-series models, random variation is 77 percent of 
total variation versus 64 percent for the Corn Belt. 
Aside from overall larger overall and random variation, however, the effect of 
aggregation is similar in the Northern Plains (Table 2.8).  Because the long time-series 
model of Northern Plains wheat does not contain a unit effect, aggregation from the unit 
to the farm level has no effect on the level of systematic variation represented by the 
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model.  The unit effect is significant in the short time-series model, however, indicating 
greater cross-sectional (and systematic) variation in the short time-series. Aggregation to 
the county- and region-level sharply reduces systematic and random variation in both the 
long and short time-series model, as in the Corn Belt models.  
 
Normalizing Data and Testing Distributions 
The appropriate distribution to use when modeling crop yields is controversial.  
Many researchers have argued that yields are not normally distributed due, in part, to 
negative skew that can be introduced by crop failure (Day; Gallagher;  Buccola; Moss 
and Shonkwiler; and Ramirez; among others).  Just and Weinegar, however, argue that 
studies rejecting normality suffer, in part, from methodological errors that could lead to 
type I error and provide empirical examples to make their point. Ultimately, Just and 
Weinegar argue that crop yields must be asymptotically normal due to the Central Limit 
Theorem.4  As already noted, Atwood et al. suggest that the Just-Weninger approach may 
lead to type II error in tests for yield normality.  More recently, in a study of out-of-
sample predictions, Norwood et al, 2004, argue that use of an empirical distribution 
results in more accurate yield predictions when compared to a range of parametric 
distributions including normal, gamma, and beta.  These results, however, are based on 
county-average yields, indicating that farm-specific idiosyncratic random variation has 
already been averaged out.  
In this section, I test the distribution of farm-specific yield variation against the 
normal, gamma, and beta distributions.  Because results depend on unit-specific 
                                                 
4 They cite the work of White and Domowitz who argue that the Central Limit Theorem applies broadly to 
economic time-series, such as prices, as well as cross-sectional data. 
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parameters, only the longer time-series data are used.  Before testing, moreover, variation 
that is unique to specific farms must be isolated, beginning with the normalized errors 
based on the mean and variance models already estimated: 
 (2.3)     ijktijktijktijkt yy σε ˆ/)ˆ(ˆ
* −=   
where ( ) 5.0ˆˆˆ ijktijktijkt y νσ = is the variance model estimate of yield standard deviation.  
These errors represent total random variation in crop yields, including the variation 
unique to crop insurance unit i, variation common to all units in farm j, and variation 
common to all farms in the county and region.  Because these errors include these 
common variations, they are likely to be correlated across units within farms (because of 
common management) and across farms within counties (due to common weather, 
similar soil conditions, etc.).   
 To remove county- and region- level correlation, I calculate a county average for 
the normalized yield errors (implicitly the county average also includes errors common to 
the region) and subtract it from the normalized error:  






*1* ˆˆ εε  and kI  is the number of crop insurance units in county k.   
To eliminate the possibility of correlation among units within a farm, a single unit 
is selected at random from each farm. Analysis in the previous section shows that only a 
modest portion of variance is lost when aggregating from units to farms, so little is lost.  
In what follows, the unit-specific subscript is dropped; the selected unit is assumed to 
represent the farm.  
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After subtracting annual county-average errors, the resulting farm-specific error 
may no longer have a unit variance.  To ensure unit variance across farm-specific errors, I 
divide each observation by its unit-specific standard deviation:   
(2.5)    jjtjt s/ˆˆ
*** εε =  
where 
2**12 )ˆˆ(∑ −= −
t
jjtjj Ns εε , ∑−=
t
jtjj N
*1* ˆˆ εε , and jN  is the number of yield 
observations for farm j.   
To distinguish the normalized error from errors adjusted for other distributions, I 
denote **ˆˆ jt
n
jt εε = .  For the non-normal distributions I am testing, normalization to constant 
mean and standard deviation across farms ensures that scale and shape parameters will 
also be constant.  Using **ˆ
jtε  as a starting point, normalized errors are relocating and/or 
rescaled to the range of values supported by each distribution:   
• For the beta distribution, all observations must fit into the unit interval.  I use the 
minimum and maximum **ˆ
jtε  (across farms and time for the entire region) to move 














.   
• For the gamma distribution, observations need only to be translated to be positive: 
)ˆmin(ˆˆ **** εεε −= jt
g
jt , i.e., the threshold parameter is the minimum value of
**ˆ
jtε  
across farms and time for the entire region.   
• Finally, because skew can only be positive in the gamma distribution, I also use 
an alternate, gamma-based normalization: gjt
g
jt εεε ˆ)ˆmax(ˆ
** −=−  where )ˆmax( **ε  
is the maximum value of **ˆ
jtε .  I refer to this distribution as gamma-minus. 
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Using the relocated  and rescaled data, distribution parameters are estimated using 
maximum likelihood methods (estimated using PROC UNIVARIATE in SAS; see Table 
2.9).   
 




1 Scale2 Shape1 Shape2 
Corn Belt Corn  
Normal 303,177 0 0.96 -- -- 
Beta 303,177 0 1.00 14.9 12.8 
Gamma 303,177 0 0.18 31.3 -- 
Gamma-
Minus 303,177 0 0.20 23.9 -- 
      
Northern Plains Wheat 
Normal 91,622 0.0063 0.98 -- -- 
Beta 91,622 0 1.00 17.8 24.3 
Gamma 91,622 0 0.19 29.9 -- 
Gamma-
Minus 91,622 0 0.13 59.0 -- 
1Location is the mean for the normal distribution, threshold parameter for 
gamma and beta distributions 
2Standard deviation for normal distribution 
 
 Standard non-parametric methods are used to test the fit of the normalized, 
relocated, and rescaled data against normal, beta, gamma, and gamma-minus 
distributions.   For a general test of the equality of distributions for samples, Hogg and 
Craig suggest converting data to a contingency table format and applying a chi-squared 
test. Multi-sample generalizations are straightforward (Hollander and Wolfe; Conover). 
For large samples, the resulting test statistic has a chi-squared distribution 
(approximately) with degrees of freedom equal to (r-1)(c-1) where r is the number of 
rows and c is the number of columns in the contingency table.   
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For this problem, a 2-row contingency table is set up to compare the observed, 
normalized, relocated, and rescaled data (placed in row 1 of the contingency table) 
against a simulated dataset drawn from one of the parametric distributions using 
parameters described in Table 2.9 (placed in row 2 of the contingency table).  For 
example, the simulated normal distribution for Corn Belt corn is built through repeated 
Monte Carlo draws from a normal distribution with mean and standard deviation 
parameters of 0 and 0.96, respectively.  The data are divided into 10 columns using 
criteria that are common to both rows.  The range of normalized yield values included in 
each column is based on percentiles of the observed data.  Column one, for example, 
includes all observations (for both rows) that are equal to or less than the 10th percentile 
of the observed data.  Column two contains values that fall between the 10th and 20th 
percentiles, and so on.  Chi-squared tests are carried out using PROC FREQ in SAS. 
I also use a two-sample version of the Kolmogorov-Smirnov (KS) test to compare 
the distribution of the observed data against distribution-specific simulated datasets.  In 
the KS test for goodness-of-fit, the test statistic is the maximum difference between the 
empirical distribution functions for the observed and simulated data.  Because the KS test 
is formulated for continuous distributions, there is no need to place the data in arbitrary 
columns as in the chi-squared test.  In large samples, the distribution of the test statistic 
can be found using an asymptotic approximation.  KS tests are carried out using PROC 
NPAR1WAY in SAS.  For details on the test statistic and the approximation of p-values 
see SAS Institute, 2004b. 
Goodness-of-fit test statistics are reported in Table 2.10.  None of the distributions 
investigated here are a good fit for the crop insurance yield data.  All four distributions 
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are strongly rejected for both chi-squared and KS tests.  Based on the value of the test 
statistics, the gamma-minus distribution comes closest to fitting the data for both Corn 
Belt corn and Northern Plains wheat.  That may be due to negative skew found in the 
normalized yield data for both Corn Belt corn (skew= -0.18) and Northern Plains wheat 
(skew = -0.20).  Of the four distributions investigated, only the gamma-minus and beta 
distributions can accommodate negative skew.   
 
Table 2.10.  Results of Chi-Squared and Kolmogorov-Smirnov Tests 
Chi-Squared Tests KS Tests 
Distribution 
Number of 
Observations Statistic  p-value Statistic  p-value 
Corn Belt Corn 
Normal 303,177 888.5 <.00001 7.88 <.00001 
Beta 303,177 704.8 <.00001 7.15 <.00001 
Gamma 303,177 3,707.0 <.00001 17.53 <.00001 
Gamma-Minus 303,177 251.6 <.00001 4.77 <.00001 
      
Northern Plains Wheat 
Normal 91,622 657.9 <.00001 7.30 <.00001 
Beta 91,622 928.0 <.00001 8.47 <.00001 
Gamma 91,622 1,825.7 <.00001 12.18 <.00001 
Gamma-Minus 91,622 226.2 <.00001 3.17 <.00001 
 
To provide additional insight, the normalized, relocated, and rescaled yield data 
are presented graphically.  Histograms showing the Corn Belt data normalized for the 
four candidate distributions along with the theoretical curves for the distribution are 
shown in Figures 2.1-2.4.  Figures 2.5-2.8 are for Northern Plains Wheat. The graphics 
confirm that the gamma-minus distribution appears to be the best fit for the data. 
Gallagher also used a gamma distribution, set up in a similar way, to model soybean 
yields. Gallagher argued that crop yields are likely to exhibit negative skew because 
maximum yields are limited by the genetic potential of the crop but could go as low as 
zero under extreme weather conditions.  In the lower tail of each distribution (what 
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appears to be the upper tail in gamma-minus) the parametric distributions appear to have 
less weight than the empirical distribution.  The opposite is true of the upper tail, where 
the parametric distributions generally place greater weight.  Closer to the mean, the 
parametric distributions appear to be slightly to the left of the empirical distribution.  
Both features are less pronounced in the gamma-minus distribution than in other the other 






Figure 2.1.  Corn Belt Corn Yields and the Normal Density Curve 






Figure 2.2.  Corn Belt Corn Yields and the Beta Density Curve 






Figure 2.3.  Corn Belt Corn Yields and the Gamma Density Curve  





Figure 2.4.  Corn Belt Corn Yields and the Gamma-Minus Density Curve  






Figure 2.5.  Northern Plains Wheat Yields and the Normal Density Curve 





Figure 2.6.  Northern Plains Wheat Yields and the Beta Density Curve 








Figure 2.7.  Northern Plains Wheat Yields and the Gamma Density Curve 





Figure 2.8.  Northern Plains Wheat Yields and the Gamma-Minus Density 
Curve 




The yield models and associated analysis are relevant to the ongoing debate on 
crop yields in two ways.  First, estimation results indicate that time trends may be 
important, but that careful scrutiny is also important.  The only time trend variable 
included in any of the four models estimated here is the linear term for the long time-
series for corn in the Corn Belt.  In most cases, scrutiny of time marginal effects showed 
evidence of over-fitting.  While the parameter associated with every nonlinear and linear 
time term tested was found to be significantly different from zero, marginal effects were 
often negative or unreasonably large.  Both results indicate that a time-series of 10 years 
is just long enough to estimate a linear time trend (if one does exist) but too short to 
reliably estimate a non-linear time trend, even if the long term trend is non-linear.    
Second, in terms of the debate over yield distribution, the analysis presented here 
suggests that crop yields are not well represented by any of the common distributions 
tested.  The best representation is based on the gamma-minus distribution, which can 
accommodate negative skew as noted by Gallagher. Normalized yield data for both 
crop/region combinations appear to exhibit a small negative skew. My overall results – 
that these parametric distributions are not a good fit for the yield data – is consistent with 
the recent results of Norwood et al., who find that an empirical distribution is better 
suited to out-of-sample yield predictions than any of a range of parametric distributions, 
including those tested in this study.   
Finally, the implications of aggregation for data use are extensive.  While it has 
always been known that yield variation can be fully represented only through the use of 
farm-specific panel data, the loss of variability – particularly random variability – due to 
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spatial aggregation appears to be quite large.  In addition to losing a very large proportion 
of systematic yield variation, nearly one-half of random variation is lost when data are 
aggregated from farms to counties.  
The loss of variation due to aggregation across farms within a county can have 
significant implications for the use of cross-sectional, farm-level data. While the loss of 
systematic variation would be expected when aggregating across farms, the loss in 
random variation appears to be just as large – a result that holds for both region/crop 
combinations and both the long and short time-series models.  The result implies that, 
within a single year, there is a high level of random variation in yields across farms 
located in the same county.  Farm level data that are collected only in cross section (e.g., 
USDA’s Agricultural Resource Management Survey (ARMS)) generally provide only the 
current year’s production. Given the large random variations across farms, yield from a 
single year may provide only a poor estimate of cross-sectional variation in intended 
production.   
Likewise, characterizing yield variability using county average yield data could 
result in considerable error.  While some researchers have used county data to calculate a 
yield variance (see Wu, for example), such a procedure would capture the effect of 
annual yield shocks common to all producers in the county (due, for example, to annual 
variation in weather), but not yield shocks that are specific to individual farms.  Given 
that farm-specific shocks can account for one-half or more of total random variation, 
county-level estimates of yield variance could be quite different from actual farm-level 
variance.  
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Appendix 2.1:  Hypotheses for Mean Model Specification Tests 
In the mean model, calculating the average p-value for a single parameter 
restriction model involves five steps:   
• Initial estimation of the unrestricted mean models (one for each of 100 data 
groups) to obtain residuals; 
• Specification of a variance models for each group (see appendix 2.2); 
• Estimation of heteroskedasticity corrected, unrestricted, and restricted models; 
and 
• Calculation of the F-statistics and associated p-values from residuals of the 
unrestricted and restricted models; 
• Calculation of average p-values. 
 
A formal statement of the unrestricted mean model and parameter restriction for 
the test results given in Tables 2.3, 2.4, 2.5, and 2.6 is given in Appendix Table 2.1.  The 
left-hand columns correspond to the table number in the text and the test number, 
respectively.  For each test, the unrestricted model, null hypothesis ( 0H ), and alterative 
hypothesis ( AH ) are shown. 
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Appendix Table 2.1.  Formal Statement of Mean Model Hypothesis Tests  
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Appendix 2.2:  Variance Model Specification and Heteroskedasticity Correction 
For any given mean model specification, squared residuals and predicted yields 
are used to estimate the variance model, beginning with the initial variance model 
(equation (2.2)):  












= , ijktε̂  is the residual and ijktŷ  is the predicted yield from the mean 
model.  
 Specification testing proceeds as follows.  First, I test whether the variance model 
time-effect parameter is equal to zero. Specifically, I test 0:0 =
v
tH β against the 
alternative .0: ≠vtAH β   
• If 0:0 =
v
tH β is rejected, the time term is retained in the variance model   
• If 0:0 =
v
tH β is not rejected, the time term is not retained in the variance model. 
The next three tests involve nested hypotheses:  that the unit-level effect 
parameters, the farm-level effect parameters, and county level effect parameters, 
respectively, are all equal to zero in the variance model.   
Test 1 (crop insurance units) tests IiH vi ∈∀= 0:0 β  where I is the set of all crop 
insurance units (within a given group) against the alternative 
IioneleastatforH viA ∈≠ 0: β .   
• If IiH vi ∈∀= 0:0 β  is rejected, then unit-, farm-, and county-level effects are 
retained in the variance model.  
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• If IiH vi ∈∀= 0:0 β is not rejected, then unit-level effects are deleted from the 
model and Test 2 is performed. 
Test 2 (farms) tests JjH vj ∈∀= 0:0 β  where J  is the set of all farms (within a given 
group) against the alternative JjoneleastatforH vjA ∈≠ 0: β . 
• If JjH vj ∈∀= 0:0 β is rejected then farm- and county-level effects are retained 
in the variance model.  
• If JjH vj ∈∀= 0:0 β is not rejected, then farm-level effects are deleted from the 
model and Test 3 is performed. 
Test 3 (counties) tests KkH vk ∈∀= 0:0 β where K is the set of all counties (within a 
given group) against the alternative KkoneleastatforH vkA ∈≠ 0: β . 
• If KkH vk ∈∀= 0:0 β is rejected then county-level effects are retained in the 
variance model.  
• If KkH vk ∈∀= 0:0 β is not rejected, then county-level effects are deleted from 
the model. 
 
If the variance model indicates the presence of heteroskedasticity, then the mean 
model is re-estimated correcting for it by multiplying both sides of the unrestricted mean 






Chapter 3:  Asymmetric Information in Federal Crop Insurance: 
Comparing High and Low Risk Areas 
 
A number of researchers have argued that asymmetric information is a critical 
problem in the Federal crop insurance program (e.g., Skees and Reed; Vandeveer and 
Loehman; Just, Calvin, and Quiggen; Makki and Somwaru). Asymmetric information can 
take more than one form.  In cases of hidden information, the insurer lacks good 
measures on the farm-specific likelihood of a yield or revenue loss needed to accurately 
rate crop insurance premiums.  This type of asymmetric information can lead to adverse 
selection, where producers who are charged a lower than actuarially fair rate are more 
likely than other producers to purchase crop insurance or to purchase high levels of 
coverage. When asymmetric information takes the form of hidden action, the insurer 
cannot effectively monitor producer behavior, perhaps encouraging some producers to 
forgo some of the (costly) inputs and practices necessary to limit the likelihood of crop 
losses.  The incentive to skimp on inputs is referred to as moral hazard. 
In practice, these problems can lead to large underwriting losses, even as 
participation remains low.  Between 1981 and 1993, crop insurance underwriting losses 
totaled $2.3 billion (GAO) while participation hovered at about 25 percent of eligible 
acreage (Glauber). Subsidy increases in 1995 and again in 1999/2000 pushed crop 
insurance participation to roughly 80 percent of eligible acreage (Dismukes and 
Vandeever) and appear to have brought crop insurance premium revenues into line with 
indemnity payments, at least when viewed at a national scale.  This gain, however, came 
at a high cost: Government expenditures for premium subsidies – which are not 
considered underwriting losses – reached $2 billion in 2003.  On a regional scale, 
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moreover, underwriting losses persist in many areas of the Great Plains and the Southeast 
(Glauber).   
Have premium subsidies simply masked chronic underwriting problems?  High 
subsidies have successfully increased crop insurance participation, perhaps encouraging 
crop insurance purchase by low risk producers who rarely collect indemnities. Glauber’s 
observations suggest the possibility of regional differences in the effectiveness of crop 
insurance premium rating. If regional differences in asymmetric information can be 
found, it may suggest that existing crop insurance premium rating methods are more 
effective in some regions than in others.  It may also suggest that premiums collected in 
some regions are subsidizing underwriting losses in other areas of the county.   
Previous studies of asymmetric information have been restricted in scope. For 
example, Just et al., use survey data on corn and soybean producers. Makki and Somwaru 
study corn and soybeans in Iowa. Vandeveer and Lohman study corn producers in a 
single county in Indiana.  To complement and extend the results of these and other 
previous studies, I estimate the effect of asymmetric information in a region where crop 
production is less risky (non-irrigated corn in the Corn Belt) and another where crop 
production is more risky (continuously cropped wheat in the Northern Plains). 
In this Chapter, I modify an existing model of asymmetric information in 
insurance markets, based on the work of Chiappori and Salanie, for use with crop 
insurance contract, yield, and actuarial data.  Because the crop insurance files are an 
extremely rich source of data on crop yield risk and crop insurance participation, I am 
able to extend their model in a number of ways.  I estimate the model for Corn Belt corn 
and Northern Plains wheat, then compare and contrast the results in terms of overall 
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production risk, coverage levels, and expected net return to crop insurance purchase, 
focusing on the effect of asymmetric information on crop insurance coverage.  
 
Testing for Asymmetric Information:  Theory 
 The theory presented here is based largely on Rothschild and Stiglitz (1976; 
referred to here as RS) except that I do not consider market supply of insurance contracts 
or market equilibrium.  For federal crop insurance, the Risk Management Agency of the 
U.S. Department of Agriculture (RMA) sets the terms of sale to farmers and agrees to 
accept program losses, effectively voiding the zero-profit condition used by RS to 
characterize the supply of insurance contracts.  I focus, instead, on crop insurance 
demand, given terms specified by RMA. 
RS show that, among producers who are considered “observationally equivalent” 
by the insurer, those at higher risk of loss will demand more insurance than producers 
with lower loss risk.  Individuals who are observationally equivalent are all offered the 
same menu of insurance contracts.  For many RMA crop insurance products, including 
popular yield and revenue insurance products like Average Production History (APH) 
and Crop Revenue Coverage (CRC), producers who are located in the same county and 
have the same RMA yield average are generally presumed to be observationally 
equivalent—they are offered the same menu of insurance options and premium rates.5  If 
these producers differ in terms of loss risk, however, this information asymmetry could 
lead to adverse selection or moral hazard. 
                                                 
5 Some farms are also classified into “high risk areas” with additional premium charges.  These differences 
are captured empirically by the RMA adjusted base rate used to characterize RMA yield loss risk rating in 
the econometric analysis. 
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In this section, I derive expressions for both yield- and revenue-based insurance 
indemnities and use them to show that yield loss risk is the key source of systematic 
variation in coverage choice for both yield and revenue insurance purchase decisions.  
While revenue insurance indemnities are triggered by low revenue rather than low yield, 
market prices and price risk are the same for all observationally equivalent farms, leaving 
yield loss risk as the key source of heterogeneity.  Producers with relatively high yield 
loss risk – regardless of whether they choose yield or revenue insurance – will be more 
likely to purchase high levels of insurance coverage than observationally equivalent 
producers with low yield loss risk.   
 Consider a set of producers which share a common mean yield and a common 
yield distribution up to a scale factor (standard deviation, for example).  Yields for 
producer j can be written as jtjjt yy εσε ++= , where y is mean yield, ε is a mean-zero 
error component common to all farms in a given area (e.g., county), jσ is the farm-
specific scale parameter (e.g., standard deviation), and jtε  is a random variable drawn 
independently for each farm from a common distribution with mean zero ( 0)( =εE ) and 
standard deviation equal to one.  For practical purposes, producers who are located in the 
same county also face the same expected price and price risk: p is the expected price 
when insurance is purchased and µ is the (mean zero) change in price over the season, 
which is common to all producers in a county but unknown at the time of insurance 
purchase.   
For yield-based insurance, the crop insurance indemnity (loss) per dollar of crop 
insurance liability (the loss-cost ratio or LCR) for coverage levelθ  on farm j in year t is: 
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(3.1) ( )( )))(()(),|( 1 jtjjtjjYjt yyyyyZyL εσεθθεσεθσθ ++−++>= −  
where Z is an indicator function which is equal to one when actual yield falls below the 
guarantee level (i.e., when tjyy εσεθ ++> ); zero otherwise.  The remaining part of the 
equation is the indemnity (dollars per dollar of liability) given Z=1. The expected value 
of the LCR can be written as: 
(3.2) ( )))|(()()Pr()),|(( 1 εσεθθθεσεθσθ jjjY yyyEyyyyyLE ++>−++>= −  
where )Pr( εσεθ jyy ++>  is the probability of an indemnity and the remaining part of 
the equation is the expected indemnity per dollar of liability, given a yield low enough to 
qualify for an indemnity. 
The RMA premium rate (dollars per dollar of liability) for coverage levelθ , given 
mean yield y , can be expressed as: )),|((),|( ky
YY
yLEky σθθρ =  where kyσ  is the level 
of yield risk implicitly associated with y  by RMA premium rating methods in local area k 


















Note that 0=YjR θ  when kyj σσ = .  Because expected indemnity grows as yield 
variability rises6, net return would be positive for producers with relatively high yield risk 
(i.e., 0>YjR θ  when kyj σσ > ) and negative for producers with relatively low yield risk 
(i.e., 0<YjR θ  when kyj σσ < ) regardless of coverage level. 
                                                 
6 Indemnity grows because greater yield variability increases the probability of an indemnity (a specific 
percentage loss) and increases the average size of the indemnities that are paid.  
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A revenue-based indemnity would be triggered when actual revenue falls below 
some proportion of expected revenue. The first step to analyzing revenue-based insurance 
is to develop an expression for expected revenue: 
)()()))((( µεσεµεσεµ EEypypE jj ++=+++  
where 0)( =εE , 0)( =εE , and 0)( =µE .  The last two terms of the RHS represent the 
covariance between random movements in price and yield.  Price-yield correlation varies 
spatially and can be large.  Harwood et al. found correlation between corn prices and 
county average yields of less than -0.4 for most of Northern Illinois (the portion of the 
Corn Belt that is the focus of this study). These systematic correlations result from factors 
affecting crop production broadly, such as widespread drought or excessive rainfall that 
could affect market prices. Given these results, I assume that 0)( ≤εµE .  Farm-specific 
yield variations, however, are not large enough to affect market prices that are 
determined on a national or even global scale, so I assume that 0)( =µεE  and expected 
revenue reduces to )( εµEyp + . 
The crop revenue insurance indemnity (dollars per dollar of liability) on farm j, in 
year t, for a given level of coverage,θ , is: 
(3.3) 
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To show the difference between yield and revenue-based indemnities, I modify 
the expression for the yield-based indemnity by multiplying each side of the inequality in 



























































The difference between the yield (3.6) and revenue (3.7) insurance indemnities for a 
given producer and coverage level depends on the effect of two terms: )( εµθE  and ytθµ , 
which are included in revenue equation (3.7) but not yield equation (3.6).  The first term 
accounts for the effect of price uncertainty on revenue given the coverage level and 
average yield. The second adjusts for the effect of price-yield covariance on expected 
revenue.  Because these terms are constant within a small area (e.g., county) for farms 
with the same average yield, producers who are observationally equivalent for yield-
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based insurance are also observationally equivalent for revenue-based insurance.  Given a 
specific coverage level, moreover, systematic variation in revenue-based expected 
indemnities across these producers is found only in the yield variability parameter (σ), as 
in the case of yield insurance.   
The revenue insurance premium rate (dollars per dollar of liability) for coverage 
levelθ , given mean price p and mean yield y , can be expressed as  
)),,,|((),|( µσθθρ pyLEky ky



















Because yield risk is the underlying source of variation in revenue insurance, 0=RjR θ  
when kyj σσ = , and expected indemnity grows as yield risk grows, net return is positive 
for producers with relatively high yield risk (i.e., 0>RjR θ  when kyj σσ > ) and negative 
for producers with relatively low yield risk (i.e., 0<RjR θ  when kyj σσ < ) regardless of 
coverage level. 
 Combining these observations with the theory stated by RS, Figure 3.1 traces out 
the implications of asymmetric information.  The curves represent expected net return to 
crop insurance purchase for producers who are located in the same area (i.e., county) and 
have the same mean yield but differ in yield variability (i.e., observationally equivalent 
producers under current rating methods).  As already noted, net returns are upward 
sloping and pass through zero when kyj σσ =  for all insurance types and coverage levels.  
At the vertical ($) axis yield risk is zero so the intercepts for high and low coverage are 
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)( highθρ−  and )( lowθρ− , respectively.  Finally, as RS show, for farmers with high yield 
loss risk ( kyj σσ > ) the expected net return to high coverage would be larger than 
expected net return to low coverage (i.e., 0,, >> lowjhighj RR ), while for producers with 
lower yield loss risk ( kyj σσ < ) expected net return would be negative for all coverage 
levels, but would be more negative for high coverage than for low coverage (i.e., 




Producer j will purchase coverage of level θ only when: 0>+ θθ η jjR  and 
'' θθθθ ηη jjjj RR +>+  where θη j is the premium the producer j would be willing to pay 
for risk reduction due to insurance coverage θ.  High yield loss risk producers ( yj σσ > ; 
cσ  in Figure 3.1) who seek to maximize returns from insurance purchase would select 
Aσ  
Bσ  






highjR ,  
lowjR ,  
Figure 3.1 Expected Net Return to Crop Insurance Formatted: Font: Bold
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high coverage.  Even risk neutral producers (i.e., for whom θη j  = 0) would find it 
profitable, over time, to purchase high insurance coverage. These results hold for both 
yield and revenue insurance products.  
For low yield loss risk producers ( yj σσ < ; BA σσ , in figure 3.1), expected return 
to crop insurance purchase is negative for all insurance types and coverage levels.  For 
these producers, overall return to crop insurance will be positive only if they are willing 
to pay a risk premium large enough to fully offset negative expected return. While high 
coverage offers a lower expected net return, it also offers greater risk reduction than low 
coverage would.  So, highly risk averse producers may choose high coverage even when 
their yield risk is relatively low ( kyj σσ < ).  Assuming that low yield risk producers are 
not systematically more risk averse than other producers, however, higher (less negative) 
net return for low coverage will mean that low yield risk producers are less likely than 
high yield risk producers to purchase high coverage.   
  
Empirical Model 
The theory suggests that asymmetric information is characterized by positive 
correlation between the level of (1) yield loss risk not accounted for by crop insurance 
premiums and (2) the level of crop insurance coverage purchased, given individuals who 
are “observationally equivalent” to the insurer.  Chiappori and Salanie (referred to 
hereafter as CS) use these results to craft an empirical model that attempts to (1) identify 
loss risk not captured by insurance premiums (i.e., premium rating error) and (2) draw a 
systematic relationship between the premium rating error and the level of coverage 
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purchased by the individual, accounting for observed differences across individuals. This 
systematic relationship, if it exists, is seen as evidence of asymmetric information.     
In their empirical work on auto insurance in France, CS define two levels (high 
and low) for loss risk and coverage level.  Loss risk is defined by whether or not the 
individual had at least one accident for which he or she was at fault—an accident was 
considered evidence of high loss risk.  Motorists could purchase basic (low) coverage that 
is required by law and covers only liability or additional (high) coverage that also covers 
damage if the insured individual is found at fault.  Loss risk not captured by insurance 
premiums (i.e., premium rating errors) is identified as the residual from a binomial probit 
model of loss risk regressed on the information used by the insurer to rate premiums (e.g., 
age, gender).  In a second probit model, CS regress coverage level on the same insurer 
information.  From this equation, the residual is a measure of variation in coverage 
accounting for insurer-observed differences in loss risk.  Correlation between residuals 
from the loss risk and coverage equations is correlation between loss risk not captured by 
the insurer and the level of insurance coverage purchased, given observationally 
equivalent producers.  Statistically significant correlation is seen as evidence of 
asymmetric information.   
CS also estimated two other empirical models of asymmetric information.  Using 
a bivariate probit model with the same dependent and independent variables used in the 
two-equation model, CS argue that asymmetric information is present if the correlation 
coefficient is significantly different from zero. Finally, given concern about the role of 
underlying functional forms used by insurers to translate motorist characteristics (e.g., 
age, gender) into insurance rates, they devised a test based on non-parametric methods.  
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First, the data was divided into a number of homogeneous groups using insurer data on 
motorist characteristics (the same data used as regressors in the probit models).  Then a 
series of chi-squared tests (2X2 tables with loss risk in one dimension and coverage level 
in the other) were used to test for correlation between loss risk and coverage level.  Row-
column dependence was interpreted as evidence of correlation and, therefore, asymmetric 
information. 
I use crop insurance contract, yield history, and actuarial data to develop a similar 
test of asymmetric information in Federal crop insurance.  Because the crop insurance 
data are significantly more detailed than the automobile insurance data used by CS, I am 
able to extend their model in several ways.  First, given data on multiple years of yield 
history, I develop a continuous measure of loss risk, rather than a binary measure as used 
by CS.  The continuous measure should contain more information on yield risk than a 
binary measure.  Second, I model multiple levels of crop insurance coverage using an 
ordered (rather than binomial) probit model, allowing estimation of model parameters 
from a richer, more detailed set of data.  Finally, the crop insurance contract data contain 
a measure of yield loss risk which can be adjusted (using RMA actuarial data) to form an 
exogenous (or at least a predetermined) variable that represents RMA rating of yield loss 
risk (details below). Use of this data, rather than multiple variables representing 
individual characteristics, removes concern about functional form that led CS to develop 
a non-parametric test. Use of a bivariate regression model also offers a richer 
interpretation of the effect of asymmetric information.    
My bivariate regression model of asymmetric information in the Federal crop 
insurance program is:   
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j edL +++= ∑ ,0 ρβββ ρ   (yield loss risk equation) 







j edc +++= ∑ ,0* ρβββ ρ   (coverage equation) 
(3.10)     ),,,,(~),( ruuNee cLcLcL σσ  
where jL  is a measure of yield loss risk for farm j (see data discussion for details); 
*
jc  is 
the producer’s desired level of coverage for farm j (coverage is observed only at discrete 
values, so the underlying continuous variable, *jc , is latent); kd is a dummy variable equal 
to 1 for county k, 0 otherwise, jABR,ρ  is the RMA adjusted base rate (an RMA measure of 
yield loss risk explained in the next section) for farm j; Lkβ and
c
kβ are parameters 
representing county-effects in the yield loss risk and coverage equations, 
respectively; Lρβ and
c
ρβ are parameters representing the effect of the RMA measure of 
yield loss risk in the loss and coverage equations, respectively; Le and ce  are error terms, 
with means Lu and cu , respectively, and standard deviations Lσ  and cσ , respectively; and 
r is the correlation coefficient.  Actual (discrete) coverage levels (e.g., .65, .75) are 
related to the latent variable c* as follows:  
(3.11)     
*);1(*;*1 ****** 1
**
1 ccifHcHhcccifhcccifc Hhh ≤=<<<≤=<= − , 
Where h indexes coverage levels, **hc  is the upper limit or threshold for coverage level h, 
and H equals the number of coverage levels, minus one.  See Appendix (3.3) for detailed 
development of the likelihood function. 
 Although my equations are slightly different from those estimated by CS, their 
interpretations, particularly the interpretation of the residuals, is the same.  In the yield 
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loss risk equation (3.8) the residual represents the yield loss risk not accounted for by the 
RMA measure of yield loss risk and the county-specific dummy variables that account 
for any other county-specific differences. In other words, a large positive residual 
indicates a farm with loss risk above that implied by the RMA measure.  The residual in 
equation (3.9) represents variation in the coverage level given observed differences 
across producers, which are accounted for by including the RMA measure of loss risk 
and county-level dummy variables. Positive correlation between the residuals from 
equations (3.8) and (3.9) would indicate that producers with high yield loss risk not 
accounted for by the RMA premiums are systematically more likely than other, 
observationally equivalent producers to choose high levels of coverage. This positive 
correlation implies asymmetric information.     
A critical advantage of the bivariate regression model (over both single equation 
and non-parametric methods) is in using the model to estimate the effect of asymmetric 
information on crop insurance purchases.  Once parameters are estimated, the model can 
be used to show how the level of asymmetric information affects coverage purchase 
decisions across observationally equivalent farmers who may, nonetheless, vary in terms 
of yield loss risk. The probability that a specific farm will select coverage level h is:  
 
























































ρβββ ρ +++= ∑ .0* )|(  .   
 73
In this formulation, the parameter cρβ represents the direct effect of premium cost 
on coverage levels, given that jABR,ρ  underlies premium rates.  So, all else being equal, I 
expect 0<cρβ ; higher premium cost means less insurance. As already noted, the yield 







ojL dLe ρβββ ρ−−−= ∑  represents the 
magnitude of asymmetric information. Variation in farm-specific yield loss risk ( jL ) that 
is not matched by variation in the adjusted base rate ( jABR,ρ ) is the asymmetric 













ρ−−−= ∑  represents the 
effect of asymmetric information on coverage level.  When 0>Lρβ and 0>r , an increase 
in yield loss risk (an increase in jL ) that is not matched by an increase in the adjusted 
base rate ( ABRρ ) results in an increase in coverage level (an increase in
*
c ).  
Finally, the likelihood function can be developed using standard techniques (see 
Appendix 3.3).   Parameters are estimated using PROC QLIM is SAS.  In actual 
estimation the first threshold value is set equal to zero, i.e., 01 =c , and the other 
threshold values are estimated.   
 
Data 
Data on crop insurance contracts and yield histories for 2001 are used to estimate 
model parameters.  For corn in the Corn Belt, data from 69 counties in central and 
northern Illinois are used (counties in Major Land Resource Areas (MLRA) 108, 111, or 
115).  For wheat in the Northern Plains, data from 33 counties in North and South Dakota 
is used (counties in MLRA 53A, 53B, 53C, 54, 55A, 55B, 55C, or 56).  From this data, I 
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distill 34,300 observations for Corn Belt corn and 11,600 observations for Northern 
Plains wheat (see Table 3.1 for more details).  
 
Table 3.1  Number of Observations Used in Model Estimation  
  Corn Belt Northern Plains 
  Corn Wheat 
Total number of yield history observations (all crop 
insurance units) 
729,699 489,037 
Yield observations in units with at least 4 years history 
for 1995-2001 
453,282 255,462 
Yield observations in units with an APH, CRC, or RA 
contract in 2001 
367,875 164,363 
Yield risk observations (=number of units) 68,686 36,195 
Yield risk observations retaining only 1 per farm 34,414 11,715 
 
Crop insurance yield histories are used to define yield risk loss measures.  Up to 
10 years worth of crop insurance unit-specific yield history data are maintained by RMA.  
However, an increase in premium subsidies, beginning in 1995, prompted additional 
producers to purchase crop insurance.  For 2001, roughly 10 percent of producers who 
had at least 4 years worth of actual yield history first purchased crop insurance in 1995 or 
later.  If these additional producers have lower yield loss risk than producers who 
purchase insurance before the premium subsidy increase, these differences may help 
identify asymmetric information.  To avoid including particularly good or particularly 
bad years for some farms but not others, however, I use data on crop insurance units with 
at least 4 years of actual yield data for the 6 years between 1995 and 2000.    
I also restrict consideration to producers who purchased one of three popular 
RMA crop insurance products in 2001: Actual Production History (APH); Crop Revenue 
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Coverage (CRC); and Revenue Assurance (RA).  Underlying RMA assessment of loss 
risk for these three insurance products is a common methodology for assessing yield risk 
(see USDA-RMA, 2000a; 2000b).  Together, these insurance products account for 90 and 
95 percent of crop insurance liability in the Corn Belt corn and Northern Plains wheat 
samples, respectively.   
Underlying correlation among and within farms, if not accounted for, could 
undermine interference in the econometric estimation. The county-specific fixed effect 
already included in the model will account for any variation common to all farms within 
a county.  Intra-farm correlation is eliminated by including only one randomly selected 
crop insurance unit per farm in the estimation.  While some information is lost, the 
aggregation analysis in Chapter 2 suggests that information loss will be minimal because 
most intra-county spatial variation occurs between farms rather than within farms. 
 Yield loss risk can be summarized as the average or expected crop insurance 
indemnity for yield-based insurance.  For farm j at time t the insured loss (per dollar of 
liability) is:  



















=    
where tp  is output price, jθ is the coverage level expressed as a proportion (for 75% 
coverage θ =.75), jy
~ is the RMA rate yield7, jty  is the actual yield, and Z(.) is an indictor 
function with value one when jtjj yy >
~θ , zero otherwise.  Note that the yield guarantee – 
                                                 
7 The RMA rate yield is essential the mean yield for a producers production history.  The rate yield is used 
to make farm-specific adjustments to county-level premium rates calculated from county-level data (see  
Josephson et al.; RMA 2000a; RMA 2000b). 
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the yield level below which losses are indemnified – is equal to jj y
~θ .  The average 



















where jN  is the number of actual yield observations in yield history for farm j.   
Depending on the value of jθ , estimates of average indemnity may be zero on 
some farms, particularly in regions where crop production is less risky, even though the 
probability of receiving an indemnity is not actually equal to zero.  To capture more 















In other words, considering all below-average yields provides more information on the 
lower tail of the yield distribution than could be obtained from looking only at yields that 
are a certain percentage (e.g., 25 percent) below average.  
  For all three RMA programs considered here, producers can choose coverage 
ranging from the catastrophic (CAT) coverage (50 percent yield guarantee indemnified at 
55 percent of price) up to 85 percent of expected yield (indemnified at 100 percent of 
market price) or expected revenue.  Depending on the region and crop, some coverage 
levels are infrequently purchased.  For both Corn Belt corn and Northern Plains wheat, 
coverage levels of 50 (not including CAT), 55, and 60 percent were purchased by only a 
small percentage of producers and are combined in the analysis (Table 3.2). For the 
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Northern Plains, 80 and 85 percent coverage are also combined into a single level for the 
purpose of estimating the ordered probit model. 
 
Table 3.2.  Grouping of Coverage Levels for Estimation of Ordered Probit 
Model 
Crop Insurance “Level” for 
Ordered Probit Model 




 Coverage, Percent of APH yield 
1 CAT1 CAT1 
2 502, 55, 60 502, 55, 60 
3 65 65 
4 70 70 
5 75 75 
6 80 80, 85 
7 85 -- 
1Catastrophic coverage; 50 percent of yield at 55 percent of price 
2This is not catastrophic coverage because the producer can choose coverage at 
100 percent of price. 
 
 
The base premium rate (BPR) represents RMA assessment of yield loss risk and 
is available from crop insurance contract data (the BPR underlies APH, CRC, and RA 
premium rates).  The BPR, however, is specific to the level of coverage purchased by the 
producer. Using it directly could bias parameter estimates. To obtain an exogenous (or at 
least predetermined) measure of RMA yield risk assessment, I use the adjusted base rate 
(ABR). The ABR is calculated from the producer’s average yield (rate yield) and 
actuarial tables for the county, crop, and production practice (RMA, 2000a) and 
represents yield loss risk for a given level of insurance coverage.  In 2001, for example, 
the ABR is calculated for 75 percent coverage. The BPR is then calculated from the ABR 
using multiplicative adjustment terms: ABRjj ,ρϕρ θθ = , where jABR,ρ  is the ABR for farm j, 
θρ j  is the BPR for coverage level θ on farm j, and θϕ is the coverage differential for the 
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coverage selected by the producer. The ABR can be obtained from the BPR by reversing 






Before proceeding to the econometric results, I calculate farm-specific expected 
indemnities for 75 percent coverage (using equation (3.13) with 75.0=θ .) and expected 
net return to crop insurance (expected indemnity less insurance premium) with and 
without the premium subsidies.  Key points in the empirical distribution of all three 
measures (the 5th, 25th, 50th, 75th, and 95th percentiles) for both crop/region combinations 
are reported in Table 3.3. 
Crop production appears to be riskier in the Northern Plains, consistent with 
Chapter 2 results.  In the Corn Belt, average loss is zero for more than half of crop 
insurance units, indicating that between 1995 and 2001 these producers did not report a 
yield of less than 75 percent of their current RMA rate yield. Seventy-five percent had 
average estimated losses of $0.012/dollar of liability or less, while 95 percent had 
average estimated losses of $0.078/dollar of liability or less.  In the Northern Plains, 
average estimated losses are larger and vary more widely across producers.  More than 
half of producers reported at least one yield below 75 percent of their rate yield.  Average 
losses were estimated to be greater than $0.10/dollar of liability for 25 percent of 






Table 3.3 Simulated Distribution of Expected Indemnity and Net Returns for Yield Insurance, 75 
percent coverage, with and without premium subsidy 
Percentile 
  
5 25 50 75 95 
Corn Belt Corn 
 Dollars per dollar of liability 
Average loss1 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.012 0.078 
Average net return without premium 
subsidy2 
-0.088 -0.061 -0.046 -0.031 0.007 
Average net return with premium subsidy -0.045 -0.027 -0.018 -0.001 0.043 
Northern Plains Wheat 
 Dollars per dollar of liability 
Average loss1 0.000 0.000 0.008 0.101 0.266 
Average net return without premium 
subsidy2 
-0.130 -0.090 -0.069 -0.011 0.136 
Average net return with premium subsidy2 -0.053 -0.036 -0.023 0.053 0.209 
1Calculated empirically using equation (3.13) from text 
2Premium subsidy for 75 percent coverage was 55 percent in 2001 
 
Average net return is also more variable for Northern Plains wheat producers than 
it is for Corn Belt corn producers.  The 5th and 95th percentiles for average estimated net 
return to crop insurance (with the premium subsidy) for Corn Belt corn are -$0.045/dollar 
of liability and $0.043/dollar of liability, respectively, while the same percentiles are        
-$0.053/dollar of liability and $0.209/dollar of liability, respectively, for Northern Plains 
wheat.  In the Corn Belt, at least 75 percent of producers had negative estimated net 
return, on average, for 1995-2001.  In the Northern Plains at least 25 percent had 
estimated net returns of $0.053/dollar of liability.  These results suggest that loss risk is 
larger in the Northern Plains and that RMA premiums capture less of the variation in the 
Northern Plains than they do in the Corn Belt. 
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 Econometric estimates of key parameters from equations (3.8) and (3.9) are 
reported in Tables 3.4 and 3.5.  All parameter estimates, including county effects and 
coverage thresholds are given in Appendix Tables A3.1 and A3.2.  Likelihood ratio tests 
reported in Tables 3.4 and 3.5 show that, for both region/crop combinations, model 
variables collectively improve the value of the full likelihood function ( ),( cL ββl ) over 
models with intercepts only ( ),( 00
cL ββl ) and models with intercepts and county fixed 





cL ββββl ).  Moreover, all parameter estimates reported in Table 
3.4 and 3.5 (and most reported in Appendix Tables 3.1 and 3.2) are significantly different 
from zero at the one percent level.   
For both crop/region combinations, estimation results provide evidence of 
asymmetric information: (1) correlation is positive between the residuals for the risk loss 
and coverage equations and (2) the yield loss risk equation parameter associated with the 
adjusted base rate (ABR) is positive. Producers who have yield loss risk that is high 
relative to their ABR are likely to purchase higher coverage than producers who have 
relatively low yield loss risk. Differences in the probability of various coverage levels 
due to asymmetric information can be seen by comparing the asymmetric information 
effect across farms that are observationally equivalent or, at least, quite similar. 
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Table 3.4  Estimation Results for Bivariate Model of Corn Belt Corn1 
Equation Parameter Estimate Standard Error t-ratio p-value 
Loss risk Adjusted base rate (
ABRρ ) 0.56 0.0005 1,077.5 <0.0001 
Loss risk Error standard dev. ( Lσ ) 0.04 0.0000 7,297.9 <0.0001 
Coverage Adjusted base rate (
ABRρ ) -10.75 0.0158 -678.3 <0.0001 




Model with intercepts 
only ),( 00
cL ββl = -1,681,712     
Model with intercepts and 





cL ββββl = 645,234     
Full model ),(
cL ββl = 1,484,463     
Likelihood ratio tests: 
)],(),([2 00






cLcL ββββββ ll − = -1,290,468 (significant at 1% level) 
1Complete Results are given in Appendix Table 3.1 







Table 3.5  Estimation Results for Bivariate Model of Northern Plains Wheat1 
Equation Parameter Estimate Standard Error t-ratio p-value 
Loss risk Adjusted base rate ( ABRρ ) 1.68 0.0036 468.0 <0.0001 
Loss risk Error standard dev. (
Lσ ) 0.08 0.0000 1,931.5 <0.0001 
Coverage Adjusted base rate (
ABRρ ) -6.40 0.0462 -138.6 <0.0001 




Model with intercepts only ),( 00
cL ββl = -725,029  
Model with intercepts and 





cL ββββl = -533,930  
Full model ),(
cL ββl = -412,466  
    
Likelihood ratio tests:  
)],(),([2 00






cLcL ββββββ ll − = 242,928 
1Complete Results are given in Appendix Table 3.2 
2For derivation of likelihood function, see Appendix 3.3 
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The asymmetric information effect estimated for farm j in county k can be written 
as: 













where the “hats” indicate parameter estimates.  The asymmetric information effect is 
calculated for each farm in both datasets then classified as positive, near zero, or 
negative; “near zero” is defined as 01.001.0 ≤≤− kjA .  These bounds are constant across 
regions to facilitate inter-region comparison and were chosen with the mean and 
dispersion of the asymmetric information effects of each region in mind. (For the Corn 
Belt, the asymmetric information term has mean .0021 and standard deviation of .0461; 
in the Northern Plains, mean .0050 and standard deviation .1625).  To ensure that 
comparisons are based on observationally similar producers, the datasets are divided 
(separately) into 5 equal-size groups based on the adjusted base rate (ABR).   
For corn in the Corn Belt, Table 3.6 shows the predicted probabilities by (1) ABR 
quintile, (2) direction of the asymmetric information effect, and (3) coverage level. Only 
modest differences in the distribution of probability across coverage levels exist between 
producers with positive and negative asymmetric information effects, particularly for 
producers with adjusted base rates in the lower 3 quintiles. For producers in ABR quintile 
1, the greatest difference in coverage probability between producers with positive and 
negative asymmetric information effects is for producers purchasing 85 percent coverage: 
13.8 percent of producers with positive effects purchase compared with 12.1 percent for 
producers with negative effects.  At 75 percent coverage – the most frequently purchased 
coverage level – the difference is only 0.3 (33.6 percent versus 33.9 percent).  The 
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asymmetric information effect is slightly larger for producers who have larger ABRs.  
Results from Table 3.6 for quintile 5 are shown in Figure 3.1.  Producers with negative 
asymmetric information effects are much more likely to purchase CAT coverage 
(probability=0.32) than producers with positive asymmetric information 
(probability=0.24).  Producers with “near zero” or positive asymmetric information are 2-
3 percentage points more likely than other producers to buy coverage of 75 percent or 
greater (Figure 3.1). 
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Table 3.6.  Effect of Asymmetric Information on the Level of Crop Insurance Coverage by RMA Adjusted Base Rate 
(quintiles)—Corn Belt Corn 






Number of  
Insurance 
Contracts  CAT3 50/55/60 65 70 75 80 85 
    Predicted probability of crop insurance coverage level4  
1 <0 3,086  0.094 0.015 0.139 0.129 0.336 0.166 0.121 
1 =0 1,981  0.087 0.015 0.135 0.127 0.338 0.171 0.128 
1 >0 1,804  0.080 0.014 0.129 0.124 0.339 0.177 0.138 
           
2 <0 3,099  0.113 0.017 0.150 0.132 0.326 0.154 0.110 
2 =0 1,920  0.105 0.016 0.145 0.130 0.329 0.159 0.115 
2 >0 1,858  0.091 0.015 0.135 0.126 0.333 0.169 0.130 
           
3 <0 2,959  0.123 0.018 0.156 0.134 0.321 0.146 0.101 
3 =0 1,615  0.120 0.018 0.152 0.132 0.322 0.150 0.105 
3 >0 2,291  0.106 0.016 0.144 0.129 0.327 0.159 0.118 
           
4 <0 2,895  0.144 0.020 0.167 0.138 0.313 0.133 0.084 
4 =0 1,467  0.130 0.019 0.160 0.136 0.319 0.142 0.094 
4 >0 2,509  0.118 0.018 0.153 0.133 0.324 0.150 0.105 
           
5 <0 2,618  0.322 0.027 0.189 0.127 0.226 0.073 0.036 
5 =0 1,161  0.240 0.026 0.191 0.137 0.263 0.093 0.050 
5 >0 3,091   0.235 0.025 0.184 0.135 0.267 0.099 0.056 
1RMA premium rate for APH contracts before being adjusted for coverage level. 
2Calculated using equation (3.15) from the text  
3Catastrophic coverage; 50 percent of yield at 55 percent of price 
4Calculated using equation (3.12) from the text 
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Figure 3.2.  Effect of Asymmetric Information on the Probability of Crop Insurance 


























Table 3.7 shows the effect of asymmetric information on the coverage choices of 
wheat producers in the Northern Plains.  Differences due to asymmetric information are 
much larger than they are for corn in the Corn Belt.  Here, producers with positive 
asymmetric information effects are more likely to buy 70 percent or higher coverage than 
producers with negative asymmetric information effects.  The opposite is true for 65 
percent and lower levels of coverage. These results hold for all 5 quintiles, but become 
more pronounced as adjusted base rates rise.  Results from Table 3.7 for quintile 5 are 
shown in Figure 3.3.  Producers with negative asymmetric information effects are much 
more likely to purchase 65 percent coverage (probability=0.37) than producers with 
positive asymmetric information (probability=0.30).  Producers with positive asymmetric 
information are more likely than those with negative asymmetric information effects to 
buy 70 percent coverage (0.43 vs. 0.38) and 75 percent coverage (0.19 vs. 0.11). 
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 Table 3.7.  Effect of Asymmetric Information on the Level of Crop Insurance Coverage—Northern Plains Wheat 








Contracts  CAT3 50/55/60 65 70 75 80/85 
     Predicted probability of crop insurance coverage level4  
1 <0 1361  0.041 0.036 0.336 0.429 0.148 0.010 
1 =0 162  0.039 0.034 0.329 0.432 0.155 0.011 
1 >0 817  0.028 0.027 0.291 0.447 0.190 0.016 
          
2 <0 1244  0.052 0.042 0.353 0.409 0.135 0.009 
2 =0 195  0.055 0.043 0.358 0.406 0.130 0.008 
2 >0 903  0.037 0.032 0.307 0.429 0.178 0.017 
          
3 <0 1202  0.047 0.039 0.343 0.418 0.143 0.010 
3 =0 138  0.040 0.034 0.324 0.429 0.161 0.012 
3 >0 998  0.028 0.026 0.278 0.442 0.206 0.021 
          
4 <0 1230  0.052 0.041 0.350 0.411 0.137 0.009 
4 =0 123  0.042 0.035 0.325 0.426 0.159 0.012 
4 >0 984  0.028 0.026 0.276 0.442 0.207 0.021 
          
5 <0 1208  0.077 0.052 0.377 0.377 0.110 0.007 
5 =0 92  0.048 0.039 0.341 0.416 0.145 0.010 
5 >0 1039   0.036 0.031 0.298 0.431 0.187 0.018 
1RMA premium rate for APH contracts before being adjusted for coverage level. 
2Calculated using equation (3.15) from the text  
3Catastrophic coverage; 50 percent of yield at 55 percent of price 
4Calculated using equation (3.12) from the text 
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Figure 3.3.  Effect of Asymmetric Information on Crop Insurance Coverage -- High RMA 


























Table 3.8 gives expected net returns (expected indemnity less subsidized 
premium) for yield-based insurance for the three most popular coverage levels: 65, 70, 
and 75 percent.  For the Corn Belt region estimated net returns for producers in the first 3 
ABR quintiles range from $-0.030/$ liability to $-0.002/$ liability.  For producers in 
ABR quintile 4, the effect of asymmetric information on net return is less than $0.0030 in 
all but 1 case (75 percent coverage).  For producers in quintile 5, net returns range from  
-$0.07/$ liability to $0.010/$ liability, but are positive only for producers with positive 
asymmetric information effects.   
Given that positive expected net return is the exception rather than the rule for 
Corn Belt producers, risk reduction appears to plays an important role in crop insurance 
purchase decisions for Corn Belt producers.  Moreover, the difference in coverage levels 
between producers with positive and negative asymmetric information effects is small for 
the three levels of coverage reported in Table 3.8 (65, 70 and 75 percent).  Even so, the 
asymmetric information effect appears to introduce inequity among producers.  For 75 
percent coverage, the difference in net return for producers with positive and negative 
asymmetric information effects varies from $0.02/$ liability for quintile 1 to $0.08 for 
producers in quintile 5.   
For Corn Belt producers with negative asymmetric information, net return is 
generally more negative for higher levels of coverage.  For producers with negative 
asymmetric information effects in ABR quintile 1, average net return for 65 percent 
coverage is -$0.017/$ liability, while average net return for 75 percent coverage is -
0.023/$.   For producers with negative asymmetric information in ABR quintile 5, 
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average return is -$0.050/$ liability for 65 percent coverage and -0.070/$ liability for 75 
percent coverage.  For producers with positive asymmetric information effects, on the 
other hand, returns generally rise with the coverage level.  For positive asymmetric 
information producers in ABR quintile 1, average net return varies from -$0.008/$ 
liability (65 percent coverage) to -$0.003/$ liability (75 percent coverage).  For producers 
in ABR quintile 5 average returns vary from $0.009/$ liability (65 percent coverage) to 
$0.010/$liability (75 percent coverage).
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Table 3.8.  Effect of Asymmetric Information on Average Net Return to Crop Insurance 
  Corn Belt Corn   Northern Plains Wheat 






Effect2   65 70 75  65 70 75 
      Average Net Return3   Average Net Return3 
1 <0  -0.017 -0.020 -0.023  -0.034 -0.041 -0.046 
1 =0  -0.016 -0.018 -0.020  -0.031 -0.034 -0.035 
1 >0  -0.008 -0.007 -0.003  0.021 0.023 0.027 
          
2 <0  -0.019 -0.023 -0.027  -0.039 -0.047 -0.054 
2 =0  -0.018 -0.021 -0.024  -0.032 -0.038 -0.041 
2 >0  -0.007 -0.006 -0.004  0.026 0.027 0.029 
          
3 <0  -0.021 -0.025 -0.030  -0.043 -0.051 -0.059 
3 =0  -0.020 -0.024 -0.027  -0.026 -0.028 -0.029 
3 >0  -0.006 -0.005 -0.002  0.059 0.061 0.064 
          
4 <0  -0.024 -0.029 -0.034  -0.045 -0.054 -0.062 
4 =0  -0.023 -0.026 -0.028  -0.004 -0.008 -0.011 
4 >0  -0.002 0.000 0.003  0.071 0.073 0.076 
          
5 <0  -0.050 -0.060 -0.070  -0.053 -0.064 -0.075 
5 =0  -0.034 -0.039 -0.043  0.010 0.006 0.002 
5 >0   0.009 0.009 0.010   0.110 0.112 0.113 
1RMA premium rate for APH contracts before being adjusted for coverage level. 
2Calculated using equation (3.15) and 01.001.0 ≤≤− kjA  to define “near zero.” 




In the Northern Plains, expected returns depend more heavily on the asymmetric 
information effect.  For all 5 quintiles of the adjusted base rate, net returns are negative 
for producers with negative asymmetric information effects and positive for producers 
with positive asymmetric information effects.  For producers with negative asymmetric 
information effects, expected net return varies from -$0.075/$ liability (quintile 5, 75 
percent coverage) to -$0.034/$ liability (quintile 1, 65 percent coverage) while those with 
positive asymmetric information effects enjoy expected returns varying from $0.021/$ 
liability (quintile 1, 65 percent coverage) to $0.113/$ liability (quintile 5, 75 percent 
coverage).  Moreover, the differences in expected return between producers with positive 
and negative asymmetric information effects is large, ranging from $0.055/$ liability (65 
percent coverage, ABR quintile 1) to as much as $0.188/$ liability (75 percent coverage, 
ABR quintile 5).   
 Incentives to buy low (high) coverage are also stronger for positive (negative) 
asymmetric information producers in the Northern Plains than for producers in the Corn 
Belt.  For producers with negative asymmetric information effects in ABR quintile 1, the 
average net return to crop insurance purchase is -$0.034/$ liability for 65 percent 
coverage and -$0.046/$ liability for 75 percent coverage.  For producers in ABR quintile 
5, average net return varies from -$0.053/$ liability for 65 percent coverage to -$0.075/$ 
liability for 75 percent coverage.  For producers with positive asymmetric information 
effects, returns generally rise with the coverage level.  Producers in ABR quintile 1 enjoy 
average net returns of $0.021/$ liability (65 percent coverage) to $0.027/$ liability (75 
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percent coverage).  For producers in ABR quintile 5, average returns vary from $0.110/$ 




 Evidence of asymmetric information was found in both the Corn Belt and the 
Northern Plains, but the results of this study indicate that the consequences differ across 
regions.  In the Corn Belt, estimates indicate that shifts in coverage due to the asymmetric 
information effect are modest, as are differences in expected net return between 
producers who have negative asymmetric information effects versus those with positive 
effects.  In the Northern Plains, however, asymmetric information effects appear to be 
substantially larger, in terms of both coverage effects and differences in average net 
return.   
 A key difference between the regions is expected net return to crop insurance 
purchase.  In the Corn Belt, very few producers are likely to realize a positive expected 
net return to crop insurance purchase.  Even among producers who have positive 
asymmetric information effects, expected indemnities rarely exceed premium costs.  
These results suggest that premium rates are, on average, higher than actuarially fair 
premiums would be.   
In the Northern Plains, many producers are likely to realize net expected gains to 
crop insurance purchase, and the gains are potentially large – much larger than could be 
realized by Corn Belt producers. On the other hand, those producers who would realize 
negative expected returns to crop insurance also face larger losses than their Corn Belt 
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counter-parts.  It is not clear whether premium rates are, on average, lower or higher than 
actuarially fair rates. 
These results suggest that RMA premium rates reflect an average yield loss across 
producers who are charged the same or similar premium rate, but that actual indemnities 
vary within these groups.  The econometric estimation suggests that there are behavioral 
consequences to “averaging” across producers:  those who perceive high risk relative to 
their crop insurance premium rate will purchase higher coverage than those who do not.  
As was the case with other results, differences between producers with positive and 
negative asymmetric information effects tend to be larger in the Northern Plains than they 
are in the Corn Belt when compared on a dollar-per-dollar of liability basis. 
These findings also suggest that asymmetric information may well play a role in 
creating inter-regional differences in underwriting loss.  The aggregation analysis of 
Chapter 2 (see Tables 2.7 and 2.8) showed that the variability of yields across farms is 
larger in the Northern Plains than in the Corn Belt.  Because the RMA rating mechanism 
groups producers by average yield, the producers in each group who face relatively high 
yield loss risk tend to realize a return based on asymmetric information.  These producers 
tend to buy more coverage, increasing their private return but also increasing government 
underwriting loss.  Other producers, who have lower yield loss risk, buy less coverage or 
opt out of insurance entirely.   Because variation across producers is larger in the 
Northern Plains than in the Corn Belt, the behavioral consequences of asymmetric 
information (differences in coverage level) are also larger.         
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An important question is whether coverage and net return effects are due to 
adverse selection or moral hazard.  In adverse selection the information asymmetry 
involves hidden information:  Producers know more about production risk on their fields 
than RMA does.  For example, farms with high risk of yield loss, compared to 
observationally equivalent farms, earn higher returns from crop insurance participation 
than do other producers, without altering production practices.  In this case, a key 
underlying question is whether RMA could reasonably obtain additional information on 
producer yield loss risk from existing yield histories.  An alternate explanation is moral 
hazard.  Here, a producer who has purchased crop insurance uses production practices 
and input levels that are less effective in minimizing production risk than he or she would 
without insurance coverage.  In this case, a key question is whether crop insurance terms 
can be altered to discourage cheating.   
Current program design and economic research suggest that incentives for 
cheating, at least on a broad scale, are small.  Given that 65, 70, and 75 percent are the 
most popular levels of coverage, however, a producer would have to absorb a 25-35 
percent loss before any indemnity is paid.  This large deductible would appear to make 
moral hazard a less likely explanation for the observed asymmetric information effect 
when compared with the possibility of adverse selection.  The results of Roberts et al. 
tend to support this conclusion.  They investigated the moral hazard effect of crop 
insurance purchase by estimating the effect of crop insurance purchase on crop yields, 
finding only limited evidence of moral hazard.  In Texas, both wheat and soybean yields 
appear to have declined by about 10 percent due to crop insurance purchase.  Elsewhere, 
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however, even when yield changes were found to be statistically significant, yield 
changes were small. 
 The key question, of course, is what to do about asymmetric information.  Farm-
level expected loss data are based on only a handful of observations for each farm.  While 
these data are useful in capturing broad patterns – particularly interregional differences – 
farm-specific data are subject to considerable sampling error.  In other words, the small 
number of observations available for each farm may or may not be representative of the 
farm’s actual yield distribution and estimates of error in rating premiums are noisy.  Can 
these data be used to improve crop insurance premium rating?  And, if so, with what level 
of confidence?  I take up these questions in the next Chapter.  
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Appendix Table 3.1.  Full Econometric Model Results for Corn Belt Corn  





Loss Risk Intercept  0.0416 0.0001 743.0 <0.0001 
Loss Risk County effect 17001 0.0049 0.0001 62.8 <0.0001 
Loss Risk County effect 17003 0.0036 0.0004 9.9 <0.0001 
Loss Risk County effect 17009 0.0127 0.0001 87.6 <0.0001 
Loss Risk County effect 17011 0.0030 0.0001 41.7 <0.0001 
Loss Risk County effect 17013 -0.0017 0.0002 -8.8 <0.0001 
Loss Risk County effect 17015 -0.0193 0.0001 -168.3 <0.0001 
Loss Risk County effect 17017 0.0250 0.0001 218.6 <0.0001 
Loss Risk County effect 17019 0.0244 0.0001 374.6 <0.0001 
Loss Risk County effect 17021 0.0151 0.0001 203.2 <0.0001 
Loss Risk County effect 17029 0.0211 0.0001 239.9 <0.0001 
Loss Risk County effect 17031 0.0308 0.0004 84.1 <0.0001 
Loss Risk County effect 17039 0.0101 0.0001 118.1 <0.0001 
Loss Risk County effect 17041 0.0136 0.0001 157.5 <0.0001 
Loss Risk County effect 17045 0.0186 0.0001 221.0 <0.0001 
Loss Risk County effect 17053 0.0068 0.0001 91.6 <0.0001 
Loss Risk County effect 17057 -0.0016 0.0001 -18.7 <0.0001 
Loss Risk County effect 17059 0.0469 0.0002 289.1 <0.0001 
Loss Risk County effect 17061 0.0025 0.0001 24.4 <0.0001 
Loss Risk County effect 17063 0.0118 0.0001 146.7 <0.0001 
Loss Risk County effect 17067 0.0017 0.0001 22.0 <0.0001 
Loss Risk County effect 17071 -0.0043 0.0001 -46.5 <0.0001 
Loss Risk County effect 17073 0.0036 0.0001 49.8 <0.0001 
Loss Risk County effect 17075 0.0078 0.0001 118.4 <0.0001 
Loss Risk County effect 17077 0.0389 0.0003 131.3 <0.0001 
Loss Risk County effect 17083 0.0105 0.0001 82.3 <0.0001 
Loss Risk County effect 17087 0.0687 0.0004 168.2 <0.0001 
Loss Risk County effect 17091 0.0064 0.0001 87.1 <0.0001 
Loss Risk County effect 17093 0.0343 0.0001 329.8 <0.0001 
Loss Risk County effect 17095 0.0013 0.0001 15.1 <0.0001 
Loss Risk County effect 17099 0.0081 0.0001 121.1 <0.0001 
Loss Risk County effect 17103 -0.0005 0.0001 -6.4 <0.0001 
Loss Risk County effect 17105 0.0157 0.0001 248.7 <0.0001 
Loss Risk County effect 17107 0.0195 0.0001 269.1 <0.0001 
Loss Risk County effect 17109 0.0054 0.0001 64.7 <0.0001 
Loss Risk County effect 17113 -0.0017 0.0001 -26.0 <0.0001 




Appendix Table 3.1 -- continued from previous page 
Equation Parameter County Estimate 
Standard 
error T-statistic P-value 
Loss Risk County effect 17115 0.0079 0.0001 104.5 <0.0001 
Loss Risk County effect 17117 0.0234 0.0001 254.3 <0.0001 
Loss Risk County effect 17123 0.0031 0.0001 37.1 <0.0001 
Loss Risk County effect 17125 0.0010 0.0001 9.0 <0.0001 
Loss Risk County effect 17127 0.0140 0.0003 40.5 <0.0001 
Loss Risk County effect 17129 0.0240 0.0001 253.7 <0.0001 
Loss Risk County effect 17131 0.0036 0.0001 42.6 <0.0001 
Loss Risk County effect 17133 0.0244 0.0001 201.4 <0.0001 
Loss Risk County effect 17137 0.0029 0.0001 29.5 <0.0001 
Loss Risk County effect 17139 0.0257 0.0001 285.6 <0.0001 
Loss Risk County effect 17141 -0.0058 0.0001 -67.0 <0.0001 
Loss Risk County effect 17143 0.0025 0.0001 26.9 <0.0001 
Loss Risk County effect 17147 0.0206 0.0001 263.5 <0.0001 
Loss Risk County effect 17149 -0.0051 0.0001 -49.0 <0.0001 
Loss Risk County effect 17155 0.0000 0.0001 0.4 0.7193 
Loss Risk County effect 17157 0.0241 0.0002 145.4 <0.0001 
Loss Risk County effect 17161 -0.0018 0.0001 -15.8 <0.0001 
Loss Risk County effect 17163 0.0247 0.0001 212.1 <0.0001 
Loss Risk County effect 17167 0.0110 0.0001 129.9 <0.0001 
Loss Risk County effect 17169 0.0089 0.0001 84.4 <0.0001 
Loss Risk County effect 17171 0.0026 0.0001 20.1 <0.0001 
Loss Risk County effect 17175 -0.0011 0.0001 -12.9 <0.0001 
Loss Risk County effect 17179 0.0102 0.0001 126.6 <0.0001 
Loss Risk County effect 17181 -0.0235 0.0002 -95.4 <0.0001 
Loss Risk County effect 17183 0.0209 0.0001 284.3 <0.0001 
Loss Risk County effect 17187 0.0021 0.0001 27.3 <0.0001 
Loss Risk County effect 17193 0.0253 0.0001 215.8 <0.0001 
Loss Risk County effect 17195 -0.0055 0.0001 -61.7 <0.0001 
Loss Risk County effect 17197 0.0305 0.0001 361.3 <0.0001 
Loss Risk County effect 17199 0.0456 0.0003 153.5 <0.0001 
Loss Risk County effect 17203 0.0000    
Loss Risk Adjusted Base Rate 0.5566 0.0005 1,077.5 <0.0001 
Loss Risk Error Standard Error 0.0411 0.0000 7,297.9 <0.0001 
Coverage Intercept  1.7559 0.0015 1,194.6 <0.0001 
Coverage County effect 17001 -0.6401 0.0020 -325.9 <0.0001 
Coverage County effect 17003 -0.9863 0.0116 -85.0 <0.0001 
Coverage County effect 17009 -0.5726 0.0037 -155.0 <0.0001 
Coverage County effect 17011 -0.2922 0.0018 -161.3 <0.0001 
Coverage County effect 17013 -0.8429 0.0052 -163.4 <0.0001 
Coverage County effect 17015 -1.0299 0.0030 -344.4 <0.0001 
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Coverage County effect 17017 -0.7957 0.0029 -271.4 <0.0001 
Coverage County effect 17019 0.0898 0.0017 54.2 <0.0001 
Coverage County effect 17021 -0.3567 0.0019 -189.6 <0.0001 
Coverage County effect 17029 -0.1480 0.0022 -66.2 <0.0001 
Coverage County effect 17031 -0.3706 0.0091 -40.6 <0.0001 
Coverage County effect 17039 -0.2282 0.0022 -104.9 <0.0001 
Coverage County effect 17041 -0.1403 0.0022 -63.9 <0.0001 
Coverage County effect 17045 -0.1946 0.0021 -90.5 <0.0001 
Coverage County effect 17053 0.0128 0.0019 6.8 <0.0001 
Coverage County effect 17057 -0.6550 0.0022 -291.3 <0.0001 
Coverage County effect 17059 -0.4417 0.0041 -108.2 <0.0001 
Coverage County effect 17061 -0.6861 0.0026 -259.9 <0.0001 
Coverage County effect 17063 -0.1891 0.0020 -93.1 <0.0001 
Coverage County effect 17067 -0.6407 0.0020 -325.0 <0.0001 
Coverage County effect 17071 -0.5365 0.0023 -230.3 <0.0001 
Coverage County effect 17073 -0.5132 0.0018 -279.5 <0.0001 
Coverage County effect 17075 -0.1428 0.0017 -85.3 <0.0001 
Coverage County effect 17077 -0.4764 0.0078 -61.2 <0.0001 
Coverage County effect 17083 -0.6241 0.0032 -193.8 <0.0001 
Coverage County effect 17087 -0.5412 0.0111 -48.6 <0.0001 
Coverage County effect 17091 -0.3291 0.0018 -178.3 <0.0001 
Coverage County effect 17093 -0.2625 0.0026 -100.0 <0.0001 
Coverage County effect 17095 -0.4807 0.0021 -227.0 <0.0001 
Coverage County effect 17099 -0.4921 0.0017 -291.0 <0.0001 
Coverage County effect 17103 -0.6216 0.0020 -308.7 <0.0001 
Coverage County effect 17105 0.2117 0.0016 132.2 <0.0001 
Coverage County effect 17107 -0.2840 0.0018 -154.1 <0.0001 
Coverage County effect 17109 -0.5969 0.0021 -280.6 <0.0001 
Coverage County effect 17113 -0.0073 0.0017 -4.3 <0.0001 
Coverage County effect 17115 -0.1362 0.0019 -70.5 <0.0001 
Coverage County effect 17117 -0.3849 0.0023 -165.8 <0.0001 
Coverage County effect 17123 -0.1534 0.0021 -73.3 <0.0001 
Coverage County effect 17125 -0.9235 0.0029 -319.6 <0.0001 
Coverage County effect 17127 -0.8375 0.0094 -89.0 <0.0001 
Coverage County effect 17129 -0.3420 0.0024 -141.8 <0.0001 
Coverage County effect 17131 -0.0634 0.0021 -29.7 <0.0001 
Coverage County effect 17133 -0.8434 0.0031 -273.1 <0.0001 
Coverage County effect 17137 -0.5147 0.0024 -210.9 <0.0001 
Coverage County effect 17139 -0.0508 0.0023 -22.2 <0.0001 
Coverage County effect 17141 -0.5641 0.0022 -256.0 <0.0001 
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Coverage County effect 17143 -0.2406 0.0023 -103.7 <0.0001 
Coverage County effect 17147 -0.0016 0.0020 -0.8 0.4356 
Coverage County effect 17149 -0.6514 0.0026 -248.2 <0.0001 
Coverage County effect 17155 -0.4885 0.0029 -165.7 <0.0001 
Coverage County effect 17157 -0.7261 0.0042 -171.9 <0.0001 
Coverage County effect 17161 -0.6146 0.0029 -211.8 <0.0001 
Coverage County effect 17163 -0.6589 0.0029 -225.2 <0.0001 
Coverage County effect 17167 -0.2930 0.0021 -136.5 <0.0001 
Coverage County effect 17169 -0.7494 0.0026 -282.8 <0.0001 
Coverage County effect 17171 -0.6989 0.0034 -205.0 <0.0001 
Coverage County effect 17175 -0.0182 0.0023 -8.1 <0.0001 
Coverage County effect 17179 -0.5974 0.0020 -292.3 <0.0001 
Coverage County effect 17181 -1.5043 0.0078 -192.2 <0.0001 
Coverage County effect 17183 -0.0670 0.0019 -35.9 <0.0001 
Coverage County effect 17187 -0.1362 0.0019 -70.6 <0.0001 
Coverage County effect 17193 -0.9437 0.0032 -297.5 <0.0001 
Coverage County effect 17195 -0.6643 0.0023 -293.5 <0.0001 
Coverage County effect 17197 -0.4055 0.0021 -190.1 <0.0001 
Coverage County effect 17199 -0.4344 0.0078 -55.7 <0.0001 
Coverage County effect 17203 0.0000    
Coverage Adjusted Base Rate -10.7458 0.0158 -678.3 <0.0001 
Coverage Threshold2  0.0887 0.0001 724.0 <0.0001 
Coverage Threshold3  0.6507 0.0003 2,378.8 <0.0001 
Coverage Threshold4  1.0240 0.0003 3,276.6 <0.0001 
Coverage Threshold5  1.9141 0.0004 5,037.4 <0.0001 
Coverage Threshold6  2.5311 0.0004 5,687.3 <0.0001 




Appendix Table 3.2.  Full Econometric Model Results for Northern Plains Wheat  
Equation Parameter County Estimate 
Standard 
error T-statistic P-value 
Loss Risk Intercept  -0.0340 0.0004 -94.9 <0.0001 
Loss Risk County effect 38003 0.0730 0.0004 186.6 <0.0001 
Loss Risk County effect 38005 0.0652 0.0005 130.9 <0.0001 
Loss Risk County effect 38017 0.0700 0.0004 185.3 <0.0001 
Loss Risk County effect 38019 0.0873 0.0004 212.1 <0.0001 
Loss Risk County effect 38021 0.0527 0.0005 101.4 <0.0001 
Loss Risk County effect 38027 0.0723 0.0007 111.2 <0.0001 
Loss Risk County effect 38031 0.0927 0.0005 174.4 <0.0001 
Loss Risk County effect 38035 0.0815 0.0004 198.6 <0.0001 
Loss Risk County effect 38039 0.0979 0.0005 188.3 <0.0001 
Loss Risk County effect 38045 0.0690 0.0004 158.3 <0.0001 
Loss Risk County effect 38063 0.0790 0.0005 153.7 <0.0001 
Loss Risk County effect 38067 0.0368 0.0004 85.4 <0.0001 
Loss Risk County effect 38071 0.1067 0.0005 205.7 <0.0001 
Loss Risk County effect 38073 0.0501 0.0005 103.6 <0.0001 
Loss Risk County effect 38077 0.0481 0.0004 116.2 <0.0001 
Loss Risk County effect 38079 0.0870 0.0005 167.6 <0.0001 
Loss Risk County effect 38081 0.0373 0.0005 76.8 <0.0001 
Loss Risk County effect 38091 0.0919 0.0004 210.5 <0.0001 
Loss Risk County effect 38093 0.0896 0.0004 221.9 <0.0001 
Loss Risk County effect 38095 0.1132 0.0005 239.6 <0.0001 
Loss Risk County effect 38097 0.0644 0.0004 150.6 <0.0001 
Loss Risk County effect 38099 0.0677 0.0004 160.8 <0.0001 
Loss Risk County effect 38103 0.0648 0.0004 147.0 <0.0001 
Loss Risk County effect 46005 -0.0267 0.0008 -32.4 <0.0001 
Loss Risk County effect 46011 0.0322 0.0008 39.3 <0.0001 
Loss Risk County effect 46025 0.0036 0.0006 6.2 <0.0001 
Loss Risk County effect 46029 0.0085 0.0005 16.2 <0.0001 
Loss Risk County effect 46037 -0.0055 0.0005 -11.2 <0.0001 
Loss Risk County effect 46039 0.0233 0.0007 33.3 <0.0001 
Loss Risk County effect 46051 0.0054 0.0006 9.0 <0.0001 
Loss Risk County effect 46057 0.0405 0.0009 47.3 <0.0001 
Loss Risk County effect 46077 0.0114 0.0009 13.0 <0.0001 
Loss Risk County effect 46091 0.0048 0.0006 8.3 <0.0001 
Loss Risk County effect 46109 0.0000    
Loss Risk Adjusted Base Rate 1.6799 0.0036 468.0 <0.0001 
Loss Risk Error Standard Error 0.0828 0.0000 1,931.5 <0.0001 




Appendix Table 3.2 -- continued from previous page 
Equation Parameter County Estimate 
Standard 
error T-statistic P-value 
Coverage Intercept  1.6217 0.0048 337.7 <0.0001 
Coverage County effect 38003 0.5356 0.0050 106.5 <0.0001 
Coverage County effect 38005 1.1282 0.0064 175.3 <0.0001 
Coverage County effect 38017 0.3646 0.0049 75.2 <0.0001 
Coverage County effect 38019 0.7727 0.0053 145.7 <0.0001 
Coverage County effect 38021 0.3054 0.0067 45.8 <0.0001 
Coverage County effect 38027 0.6338 0.0083 76.0 <0.0001 
Coverage County effect 38031 0.7416 0.0068 108.5 <0.0001 
Coverage County effect 38035 0.5312 0.0053 100.7 <0.0001 
Coverage County effect 38039 0.6829 0.0067 102.2 <0.0001 
Coverage County effect 38045 0.6454 0.0056 115.1 <0.0001 
Coverage County effect 38063 0.8545 0.0066 129.1 <0.0001 
Coverage County effect 38067 0.2866 0.0055 51.9 <0.0001 
Coverage County effect 38071 1.1692 0.0067 174.5 <0.0001 
Coverage County effect 38073 0.6582 0.0062 105.7 <0.0001 
Coverage County effect 38077 0.0758 0.0053 14.3 <0.0001 
Coverage County effect 38079 0.5377 0.0067 80.7 <0.0001 
Coverage County effect 38081 0.4018 0.0062 64.4 <0.0001 
Coverage County effect 38091 0.6516 0.0056 116.1 <0.0001 
Coverage County effect 38093 0.8806 0.0052 169.1 <0.0001 
Coverage County effect 38095 0.8030 0.0061 132.1 <0.0001 
Coverage County effect 38097 0.4946 0.0055 90.0 <0.0001 
Coverage County effect 38099 0.6349 0.0054 117.3 <0.0001 
Coverage County effect 38103 0.6118 0.0057 107.9 <0.0001 
Coverage County effect 46005 0.0807 0.0105 7.7 <0.0001 
Coverage County effect 46011 -0.2509 0.0105 -24.0 <0.0001 
Coverage County effect 46025 0.1195 0.0073 16.4 <0.0001 
Coverage County effect 46029 0.1074 0.0067 15.9 <0.0001 
Coverage County effect 46037 0.4732 0.0062 75.8 <0.0001 
Coverage County effect 46039 0.0451 0.0090 5.0 <0.0001 
Coverage County effect 46051 -0.0340 0.0077 -4.4 <0.0001 
Coverage County effect 46057 0.2016 0.0110 18.4 <0.0001 
Coverage County effect 46077 0.7625 0.0112 67.9 <0.0001 
Coverage County effect 46091 0.3642 0.0074 49.1 <0.0001 
Coverage County effect 46109 0.0000    
Coverage Adjusted Base Rate -6.3998 0.0462 -138.6 <0.0001 
Coverage Threshold2  0.3141 0.0012 271.9 <0.0001 
Coverage Threshold3  1.5279 0.0017 902.6 <0.0001 
Coverage Threshold4  2.7557 0.0019 1,430.1 <0.0001 
Coverage Threshold5  4.0912 0.0030 1,351.9 <0.0001 
Coverage Correlation Coefficient 0.1368 0.0008 179.0 <0.0001 
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Appendix 3.3:  Development of Likelihood Function  
To develop the likelihood function, I write the bivariate normal density as the 
product of the marginal density of εL and the conditional density of εc:   
(A3.1)     )()(),( LcLcL eeeee φφφ =  












.  Because Le and ce  
are error terms in regression equations they will have zero means so long as the equations 
include intercept terms ( 0== Lc uu ).  Moreover, because coverage is observed only 
discretely, however, it is necessary to assume that 1=cσ  (Maddala). With these changes, 
the distributions become  
(A3.2)     ),0(~ 2LL Ne σ  and 
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From the PDF and these distributions, a likelihood function can be developed.    
The probability that *jc  falls between limits 1−hc  and hc  can be written as 
)Pr( *1 hjh ccc <≤− .  Substituting for 
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Rearranging terms and substituting gives  
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where φ  is the standard normal density function, hz =1 if coverage level h is selected, =0 
otherwise, and other variables are as defined above. Evaluating the integrals yields:  
    (A3.8)











































where Ф is the standard normal distribution function. Then the likelihood function can be 
written as 
(A3.9)     ∏=
j
jll .   
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Chapter 4: Using Farm-Specific Data in Crop Insurance Premium Rating:  Can an 
Alternate Method of Premium Rating Reduce Asymmetric Information Effects? 
 
Can premium rating methods be altered to reduce the asymmetric information 
effects identified in Chapter 3?  Existing evidence appears to be mixed. On the one hand, 
premium rating problems are pervasive enough to be identified through empirical 
analysis which, in some cases, is based on crop insurance contract data and associated 
yield histories – information already available to the Risk Management Agency (RMA) 
(also see Makki and Somwaru).  Persistent underwriting losses and the need for high 
premium subsidies rates to encourage broad participation (Glauber) tend to support the 
idea that premium rating can be improved. On the other hand, crop insurance yield 
histories – which include, at most, 10 years of data, are not sufficient to establish farm-
specific, actuarially fair premiums with a reasonable level of statistical confidence.  
Collecting additional data, moreover, is unlikely to solve the problem. Because 10 years 
already accounts for 20-25 percent of a farmer’s working lifetime, collecting a longer 
time-series on individual farms would be impractical.  
Whether an alternate method of crop insurance premium rating can reduce 
asymmetric information effects depends, in part, on what constitutes a reduction.  While 
the data constraints cited above imply that crop insurance premium rating errors are 
unavoidable at the farm level, previous research suggests that broad patterns of adverse 
selection do exist (e.g., Vandeveer and Loehman; Just, Calvin, and Quiggen; Makki and 
Somwaru).  If alternative methods of premium rating are judged on the basis of their 
broad impact on actuarial fairness (at a county or even broader level), rather than farm-
specific actuarial fairness, improvement may be possible.  In this chapter, I test the 
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hypothesis that using farm-specific yield histories to rate premiums – despite the 
uncertainties associated with small samples – could, on average, reduce overall deviation 
from actuarial fairness.  “On average” means that premiums would be closer to 
actuarially fair for many or most farms while acknowledging that data limitations make 
accurate farm-specific premium rating impossible.   
I focus on two types of error that could cause farm-specific premiums to deviate 
from actuarially fair levels.  RMA premiums are rated using farm-specific information on 
yield mean but not yield variability.  To the extent that farms which are uniform in yield 
mean are not uniform in terms of yield variability, RMA premiums are subject to error 
because the model used to rate premiums is not a theoretically correct model.  I refer to 
this source of error as “modeling error.”  On the other hand, alternate premium rates are 
based on a theoretically correct model that incorporates a noisy measure of farm-specific 
variability.  Because farm-specific estimates of yield variability are subject to sampling 
error, premium rates based on these estimates will also be subject to error.  I refer to this 
source of error as “sampling error.” 
Is the modeling error inherent in the RMA procedure larger or smaller than the 
sampling error that would be inherent in an alternate method that incorporates farm-level 
estimated yield variability?  I do not argue that this comparison should be made at the 
farm level (although I do report farm-level simulation results).  I attempt only to discern 
whether there is an alternative set of premium rates that is likely to reduce rating error 
within a region or county (i.e., for which the average level of sampling error is less than 
the average level of modeling error at the region or county level).   
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 In the next section, I develop more precise definitions of “modeling error” and 
“sampling error.”  Following that, I develop a Monte Carlo simulation in which the 
modeling error in RMA premiums can be isolated and compared to the sampling error 
that would arise from use of farm-specific information on yield variability. To provide a 
realistic starting point for the simulations, I use a yield model developed from actual crop 
insurance yield histories.  I show how the yield model can be used to define model and 
sampling error, then present and discuss results for the Corn Belt (non-irrigated corn) and 
Northern Plains (non-irrigated, continuous wheat).   
 
Modeling Error and Sampling Error 
Modeling error is the difference between the RMA premium rate and the 
theoretically correct premium rate, calculated with full knowledge of farm-specific yield 
distributions.  Even if producers purchase revenue insurance rather than yield insurance 
(and many do), the driver of asymmetric information problems is limited information on 
the potential for yield loss8.  I focus on yield-based premiums, but the results of the 
analysis would be useful in rating revenue insurance premiums, as well. 
Because RMA premiums are intended to be actuarially fair, the theoretically 
correct premium is the expected indemnity, given a specific coverage level.  The 
derivation of a theoretically correct premium rate begins with the definition of a yield 
                                                 
8
Although crop insurance sales have shifted substantially to revenue-based products in recent years, yield 
risk is still critical in the rating of crop insurance premiums.  The RMA base premium rate underlies 
producer premiums in Actual Production History (APH) (yield) insurance and also the most popular 
revenue insurance products, Crop Revenue Coverage (CRC) and Revenue Assurance (RA).  Moreover, 
intra-county differences in producer revenue risk flow almost entirely from differences in yield risk.  Thus, 
improving intra-county premium rating depends on improvement in the assessment of yield risk. 
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loss function.  For any given farm in any given year the insurance indemnity per dollar of 
liability for yield-based coverage (ex post) can be written as: 
(4.1)    




















where tp  is the guarantee price, jθ is the coverage level (purchased by farm j) expressed 
as a proportion (e.g., for 75% coverage jθ =.75), jy
~ is the rate yield9, jty  is actual yield 
at time t, and Z(.) is an indictor function with value one when jtjj yy >
~θ , zero otherwise.  



















where jN  is number of yield observations.  When jN  is large, equation (4.2) 
approximates the theoretically correct premium rate for yield-based insurance. Then 
modeling error can be defined as:   
(4.3)     ),~,()~|(* ∞→−= jjjjjjj NyLEyME θθρ   
                                                                                                                                                 
 
9 The RMA rate yield is essentially the mean yield for a producer’s production history.  The rate yield is 
used to make farm-specific adjustments to county-level premium rates calculated from county-level data 
(see  Josephson et al.; RMA 2000a; RMA 2000b). 
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where )~|( jj yθρ is the RMA premium rate for rate yield jy
~  and coverage jθ .  
Unlike theoretical premiums, actual RMA premium rates include charges for loss 
reserves, prevented planting, or catastrophic events (Josephson et al.).  To ensure a fair 
comparison between the RMA and theoretical rates, I use the minimum premium charged 
by RMA to any producer within a given county to represent these additional premium 
components.  I add the county minimum to my theoretical premium rate and subtract the 
sum from the RMA premium rate to form jME :   
(4.4)     ( )))((min),~,()~( θρθθρ kjjjjjj NyLEyME +∞→−=    
where ))((min θρk  is the lowest RMA premium for coverageθ  in county k.  
Sampling error is the difference between the theoretically correct premium rate, 
calculated from the correct yield distribution, and a theoretically correct premium rate 
calculated from a limited number of yield observations which are also drawn from the 
correct yield distribution.  For any given sample, s, sampling error for farm j can be 
defined as: 
(4.5)     ),~,(),~,( ∞→−== NyLENNyLESE jjjjjjjsjs θθ  
where jN  is equal to the number of yield observations in the yield history for farm j.   
Note that a comparison of absolute sampling error and absolute modeling error is, in fact, 
a comparison of the absolute distance of the RMA premium rate from the theoretically 
correct premium rate ))((min),~,( θρθ kjjj NyLE +∞→ and the absolute distance of the 
alternate rate ( ))((min)),~,( θρθ kjjjjs NNyLE += ) from the theoretically correct 
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premium rate.  In other words, when absolute sampling error is less than absolute 
modeling error, the alternate premium is closer to the actuarially fair rate than is the 
RMA rate. 
The distribution of jSE depends on the underlying distribution of yields and the 
size of the yield samples drawn from the underlying distribution.  (The crop insurance 
yield histories maintained by RMA include 10 or fewer yield observations.  Only yield 
histories with 8 or more observations are used.)  For any given yield distribution, the 
distribution of jSE can be approximated using Monte Carlo methods: 
( ) ( ) ])||[||Pr 1 ∞→<=< ∑− SXSEZSXSE
s
jsj     
 where S is the number of samples drawn from the yield distribution to make the 
approximation.   
The probability that absolute sampling error is less than absolute modeling error 
at the farm level can be written as: 
(4.6)     ( ) ( ) ])||||[||||Pr 1 ∞→<=< ∑− SMESEZSMESE
s
jjsjj .  
As already noted, however, there is little hope of correctly rating premiums on a farm-by-
farm basis. The probability that model error exceeds sampling error on a single farm 
gives little information on the potential for the broader success of a system of alternate 
premium rates.  Taking liability-weighted averages of || jSE  and || jME for farms within 
a given county, however, allows calculation of county-level probabilities:  









































Similar statistics can also be defined for a broader area (region): 









































 Simulation of the theoretical premium rates (equations 4.4 and 4.5) and the 
probabilities in (4.6)-(4.8) requires a yield model which is representative of the premium 
rating situation faced by RMA.  The yield models estimated in Chapter 2, based on actual 
crop insurance yield histories, are an obvious choice.  While these models can represent 
the true yield distributions only to the extent that the yield histories accurately represent 
actual yield distributions, I assume that these are the true yield distributions for the 
purpose of the simulation model.  While it is certain that these yield models are not 
accurate at the farm level, they are likely to be representative, overall, of the premium 
rating situation faced by RMA in the Corn Belt and Northern Plains.   
Combining and rearranging equations (2.3)-(2.5) from Chapter 2 leads to the yield 
model: 
(4.9)     jktjktjktktjjt yys =++ ˆˆ)ˆˆ(




jtε is the normalized yield error for farm j at time t;   
js  is the standard deviation of the farm-specific error after removal of the county average 
error; 
*ˆ
ktε  is the county-specific error for county k at time t; 
jktσ̂ is the standard deviation, based on the variance model estimated in Chapter 2, for 
farm j in county k at time t;  
jktŷ  is the predicted yield, based on the yield model estimated in Chapter 2, and;  
jkty  is the observed yield. 
 
 Because the unit-specific errors, **ˆ jtε , are independent of one another and have zero 
mean (=0) and unit variance (=1) across farms (the result of normalization procedures 
described in Chapter 2), these observations can be used to specify an empirical 
distribution common to all farms.  For datasets with relatively few observations, specific 
values are often under-represented in raw data; a problem that is typically resolved with 
smoothing techniques.  The use of these techniques, however, requires additional 
assumptions about the distribution used for kernel smoothing, bandwidth, etc.  Because 
the crop insurance yield datasets are so large (over 300,000 observations in the Corn Belt 
dataset), I elected not to smooth them.  Smoothing was not necessary as a gap-filling 
measure and tended to add weight to outlying observations. 
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The other random term is the county-specific average error, *ˆktε .  For the purpose 
of the simulation model I treat these errors as if they were fixed parameters. For a farm 
with a 10-year yield history, located in county k, 10 percent of draws from the empirical 
distribution are paired with each of the county errors calculated from the crop insurance 
yield data (there is one county-average yield per year over the 10-year yield history).  
This procedure ensures that broader weather patterns and other factors that may have 
affected yields on a broad scale are not over or under represented in the simulated yields 
for any specific farm.  For example, many corn producers in Adams County, IL, 
experienced large yield losses due to flooding in 1993.  Using a Monte-Carlo procedure 
to draw from the empirical distribution of county yield errors would risk including the 
1993 county error more than once for some farms and not at all for others.  An alternate 
procedure would be to introduce some county-level randomness by drawing “years” and 
assigning each farm its county-level error for that year.  Over the course of 1,000 
samples, however, it is unlikely that such a procedure would produce results that are 
significantly different from using the county average errors as if they were parameters, as 
proposed above.  
 Given the approach and assumptions outlined above, the yield model is  
(4.10)     **** ˆˆ)ˆ( jktjktjktktj yyse =++ σε  
where **e is a random draw from the empirical distribution and *jkty  is the simulated yield 





Simulations are based on yield insurance with 75 percent coverage, which is 
popular with producers in both the Corn Belt and the Northern Plains. Yield-based RMA 
premiums for 75 percent coverage are estimated from the base premium rate (BPR) found 
in the crop insurance contract data.  The BPR underlies Actual Production History 
(APH), Crop Revenue Coverage (CRC), and Revenue Assurance (RA) premiums.  
Because these three products are very popular, the BPR is available for contracts 
covering about 90 percent of corn insurance liability in the Corn Belt corn data and 95 
percent in the Northern Plains wheat data.   
The BPR, however, is specific to the level of coverage purchased by the producer. 
To obtain an RMA premium rate for a common level of coverage, I use the adjusted base 
rate (ABR). The ABR is calculated from the producer’s average yield (rate yield) and 
actuarial tables for the county, crop, and production practice (RMA, 2000a) and 
represents loss risk for a given level of insurance coverage.  In 2001, for example, the 
ABR is calculated for 75 percent coverage. The BPR is then calculated from the ABR 
using multiplicative adjustment terms: jABRj ,ρϕρ θθ = , where jABR,ρ  is the ABR for farm j, 
θρ j  is the BPR for coverage level θ on farm j, and θϕ is the coverage differential for the 
coverage selected by the producer. The ABR can be obtained from the BPR by reversing 




To simulate the theoretically correct premiums, I draw values of **e  from the 
empirical distribution, convert them to simulated yields using (4.10) and find the farm-
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specific expected indemnity (actuarially fair premium rate) using (4.2).  In anticipation of 
the Monte Carlo analysis, I draw up to 10 simulated yield observations per sample for 
each farm (one for each year of a specific farm’s yield history) and draw a total of 1000 
samples.  That is, for each farm I draw up to 10,000 simulated yields.   
The actual theoretical premium rate (the second term on the RHS of (4.5); 
),~,|( ∞→NyLE jjj θ ) is estimated from (4.2) using all 10,000 draws (N=10,000).  A 
total of 1,000 of the sample-specific theoretical premium rates (the first term on the RHS 
of (4.5); ),~,( jjjjs NNyLE =θ ) are calculated for each farm using (4.2).  Using these 
simulated values along with the RMA premium rate described above, farm-specific 
estimates of modeling error and sampling error can be calculated using (4.4) and (4.5), 
respectively. The probability that modeling error is greater than sampling error can be 
calculated for the farm, county, and region from (4.6), (4.7), and (4.8), respectively.  The 
average alternate premium rate, used for purpose of discerning the general direction of 
premium rate changes under the alternate rating mechanism, is 
))((min),~,|(1 θρθ k
s
jjjjs NNyLES +=∑− . 
 
Results 
Regional results are given in Table 4.1.  For both Corn Belt corn and Northern 
Plains wheat the probability that model error is larger than sampling error is reported to 
be 1.000 because the average absolute model error exceeds sampling error for each of the 
1,000 samples drawn for the Monte Carlo analysis.  In the Corn Belt the alternate 
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premium rates are, on average, $0.0024/$ liability below RMA premium rates.  In the 
Northern Plains alternate premium rates are, on average, $0.0146/$ liability higher than 
RMA rates.   
At the county level, results are mixed.  Average absolute modeling error is 
(statistically) significantly larger than average absolute sampling error in 59 of 69 Corn 
Belt counties (85 percent; see Appendix Table 4.1) and 18 of 36 Northern Plains counties 
(50 percent; see Appendix Table 4.2).  The average difference between alternate and 
RMA premium rates also varies considerably among counties, ranging from $0.001/$ 
liability to more than $0.010/$ liability in the Corn Belt data (Appendix Table 4.1).  A 
similar range is observed in Northern Plains counties (Appendix Table 4.2).   
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Table 4.1  Sampling Error, Model Error, and Difference Between Sampling and Model 
Error at the Region, County, and Farm Level 
  
  




 Dollars per Dollar of Liability 
Average Absolute Sampling Error 0.0114 0.0331 
Average Absolute Model Error 0.0210 0.0419 
Avg. Difference, Sampling less Model Error -0.0096 -0.0088 
Pr ( Sampling Error < Model Error ) 1.000 1.000 
   
Average Difference,                                      
Alternate less RMA Premium Rate -0.0024 0.0146 
      
Number of Counties 69 36 
Counties with                                                                          
Pr ( Sampling Error < Model Error ) ≥ 0.95 59 18 
Percent of Counties with                                                       
Pr ( Sampling Error < Model Error ) ≥ 0.95 85.5 50.0 
      
Number of Farms 25,491 7,244 
Farms with                                                                                
Pr ( Sampling Error < Model Error ) ≥ 0.95 7,032 1,220 
Percent of Farms with                                                              
Pr ( Sampling Error < Model Error ) ≥ 0.95 27.6 16.8 
 
Farm level results illustrate the difficulty in accurately rating premiums at the 
farm level.  In the Corn Belt, modeling error is (statistically) significantly larger than 
sampling error for only 7,032 of more than 25,000 farms in the dataset (28 percent; Table 
4.1).  Of these 7,032 farms, the alternate premium rate is larger than the RMA premium 
rate for only 540 farms (Table 4.2).  For these farms, the alternate premium rates are, on 
average, $0.095/$ liability higher than RMA premiums (see Table 4.2, top row in Corn 
Belt section).  For other Corn Belt farms (6,492 farms), alternate premiums are, on 
average, lower than the RMA premium by $0.031/$ liability.  For Corn Belt farms where 
modeling error was not found to be statistically significantly larger than sampling error, 
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average premium differences are smaller. On farms where alternate premiums are higher 
than RMA premiums, the average difference is $0.026/$ liability.  On farms where 
alternate premiums are lower, the average difference is $0.009/$ liability (see Table 4.2, 
second row).  These premium rate changes, if implemented would be large relative to 
existing premiums.  For Corn Belt corn the average ABR is $0.062/$ liability. 
In the Northern Plains, the Monte Carlo analysis shows a statistically significant 
difference between modeling and sampling error on 1,220 of 7,244 (about 17 percent; 
Table 4.1, fourth row).  Of those 1,220 farms, the alternate premium was higher than the 
RMA rate for 161 farms (Table 4.2, fourth row). For this group, alternate premiums rates 
are, on average, $0.26/$ liability higher than RMA premium rates.  The large majority of 
1,220 farms where modeling error is (statistically) significantly larger than sampling error 
– 1,059 farms – were assigned alternate premium rates which were, on average, $0.055/$ 
liability lower than the RMA rate (Table 4.2; fourth row).  
For 6,024 farms where modeling error was not shown to be statistically 
significantly larger than sampling error, premium changes would be smaller, be still large 
relative to existing ABRs.  For 3,719 farms where alternate premium rates are higher than 
RMA rates, the average difference in premium rates was $0.054/$ liability (Table 4.2, 
row 5).  For the 2,305 farms with alternate rates lower than the RMA rate, the difference 
was about $0.022/$ liability. While these differences are less than on farms where there is 
a significant difference between modeling and sampling error, they are still large relative 






Table 4.2.  Number of Farms, Insured Production, and Mean Difference Between RMA Premium Rates and Alternate 
Rates Based on a Farm-Specific Measure of Yield Variability 
    
Alternate 
Premium Rate 
> RMA Rate 
Alternate 
Premium Rate 
< RMA Rate 
All Farms 
Corn Belt Corn 
Number of Farms 540 6,492 7,032 
Insured Production (mil. bu.) 4.5 89.58 94.08 
Modeling Error > Sampling 
Error with 95% Confidence  
Mean Rate Difference1 0.0946 -0.0314 -0.0253 
Number of Farms 10,088 8,371 18,459 
Insured Production (mil. bu.) 96.833 93.183 190.016 
Modeling Error and Sampling 
Error NOT Significantly 
Different Mean Rate Difference 0.0264 -0.0091 0.0090 
Number of Farms 10,628 14,863 25,491 
Insured Production (mil. bu.) 101.333 182.763 284.096 All Farms 
Mean Rate Difference 0.0294 -0.0200 -0.0024 
Northern Plains Wheat 
Number of Farms 161 1,059 1,220 
Insured Production (mil. bu.) 0.68 5.09 5.77 
Modeling Error > Sampling 
Error with 95% Confidence  
Mean Rate Difference 0.2603 -0.0552 -0.0180 
Number of Farms 3,719 2,305 6,024 
Insured Production (mil. bu.) 15.75 10.10 25.85 
Modeling Error and Sampling 
Error NOT Significantly 
Different Mean Rate Difference 0.0542 -0.0218 0.0245 
Number of Farms 3,880 3,364 7,244 
Insured Production (mil. bu.) 16.43 15.19 31.62 All Farms 
Mean Rate Difference 0.0627 -0.0330 0.0146 
1Difference is the average alternate premium rate less the RMA premium rate 
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The farm level results can be seen more clearly in histograms showing the density 
of crop insurance liability against the difference in alternate and RMA premium rates.  In 
the Corn Belt (figure 4.1), premium rate differences ranged from -$0.043/$ liability to 
more than $0.200/$ liability, but nearly all the changes are confined to the range between 
-$0.153/$ liability (1st percentile) and $0.125/$ liability (99th percentile).  The large 
majority of changes lie between -$0.030/$ liability (5th percentile) and $0.055/$ liability 
(95th percentile). The solid colored portion of the bars in Figure 4.1 represents farms for 
which modeling error is significantly larger than sampling error.  As already noted, only 
28 percent of crop insurance liability is on farms where modeling error is demonstrably 
larger than sampling error.  Moreover, significance appears to be concentrated among 
farms that would receive a premium rate decrease if the alternate premiums were 
adopted.  As already shown in Table 4.2, only a very small number of farms can be 
shown to have expected indemnities (alternate premium rates) that are statistically 
significantly higher than RMA rates.  For about 20 percent of insurance liability, 
alternative premiums exceed RMA premiums by between $0.004/$ liability (75th 
percentile) and $0.055/$ liability (95th percentile), but almost none of these changes are 
statistically different from zero.   
In the Northern Plains (figure 4.2), premium rate differences range from about $-
0.35/$ liability to about $0.50/$ liability, although nearly all differences are contained 
between -$0.095/$ liability (1st percentile) and $0.250/$ liability (99th percentile).  The 
large majority of changes lie between -$0.050/$ liability (5th percentile) and $0.135/$ 
liability (95th percentile). Although the premium changes for Northern Plains wheat cover 
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a broader range than changes for Corn Belt corn, the story is quite similar: Only 16 
percent of crop insurance liability is on farms where modeling error is demonstrably 
larger than sampling error and it appears to be concentrated among farms that would 
experience a net decrease in premium rate if the alternative premiums were adopted.  
Given that premium rates appear to be low, on average, improved rating may depend on 
increasing premiums on some farms.  For about 20 percent of insurance liability, 
alternative premiums exceed RMA premiums by between $0.035/$ liability (75th 
percentile) and $0.135/$ liability (95th percentile), but almost none of these changes are 
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The analysis indicates that the use of farm-specific information on yield 
variability could improve the actuarial soundness of premium rating, if improvement is 
sought only at a sufficiently broad scale. At a regional scale, the result is a strong one: 
Modeling error is found to exceed sampling error in every one of the 1,000 Monte Carlo 
iterations for both the Corn Belt and Northern Plains simulations. At the county level, 
however, results are not as strong, particularly in the Northern Plains.  In 85 percent of 
Corn Belt counties, modeling error exceeds sampling error with at least 95 percent 
confidence.  Modeling error exceeds sampling error with at least 95 percent confidence in 
only 50 percent of Northern Plains counties.  Accepting a lower level of confidence helps 
a little:  At 90 percent and 80 percent confidence, modeling error exceeds sampling error 
in 56 and 61 percent of Northern Plains counties, respectively. 
Nonetheless, Chapter 4 results suggest that premium rating does contribute to 
inter-regional differences in underwriting loss. In the Corn Belt, alternate premiums 
would, on average, be lower by about 0.24 cents per dollar of liability.  On the 284 
million bushels insured under the contracts in the data used for this study, valued at $2.50 
per bushel, total premiums would be reduced by about $1.7 million per year.  Because of 
the premium subsidy, of course, the total reduction in farm-paid premiums would be less.  
In the Northern Plains, on the 31.6 million bushels of insured wheat, if valued at $4 per 
bushel, adoption of alternate premiums would result in a $2 million per year increase in 
total premiums.  Of course, these datasets account for a small portion of overall annual 
 127
crop insurance liability in these crops and regions, let alone all crops and all regions.  The 
analysis, moreover, does not account for possible changes in crop insurance purchase. 
Farm level results highlight the difficulty of transitioning to and maintaining a set 
of alternate premiums.  If the alternate premiums were adopted, large groups of producers 
in both regions would face substantial premium increases – increases for which RMA 
would have little statistical evidence.  RMA would certainly have to grapple with the 
question of when to treat a bad year (or years) as simply a bad year – the kind of situation 
crop insurance is intended to protect against – and when to consider that bad year a signal 
of higher risk that should trigger a higher rate.  Of course, current premium rating 
methodology implicitly answers these questions and the results of this analysis suggest 
that there is room to be more aggressive in adjusting premium rates. 
Of course, roughly half of all producers would see premiums decline if the 
alternate premiums were implemented.  While RMA is unlikely to be challenged by 
producers who would be offered lower rates, farm-level results show that RMA may also 
be on more solid statistical ground in offering discounts to customers with good loss 
histories.  In fact, a system of experience-based premium discounts (but not surcharges) 
has been authorized by Congress and a possible schedule of discounts was recently 
proposed by Rejesus et al.  Of course, the effectiveness of discounts without surcharges 
would vary considerably between the Corn Belt and the Northern Plains.  In the Corn 
Belt, discounts could make sense in the absence of surcharges, so long as the discounts 
are not too large.  In the Northern Plains, discounts without offsetting surcharges could 
exacerbate underwriting losses.  This analysis, and the practical evidence of persistent 
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underwriting losses in the Northern Plains (and elsewhere), indicate that premiums are, 
on average, too low.   
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17001 495 3,830,342 0.0152 0.0328 1.000 -0.0222 
17003 6 45,941 0.0267 0.1411 1.000 -0.0933 
17009 93 1,023,569 0.0208 0.0483 0.996 -0.0277 
17011 769 10,524,727 0.0072 0.0169 1.000 -0.0109 
17013 20 147,754 0.0091 0.0288 1.000 -0.0236 
17015 135 4,521,613 0.0066 0.0183 1.000 -0.0138 
17017 140 1,731,345 0.0080 0.0249 1.000 -0.0204 
17019 1304 12,381,163 0.0126 0.0150 1.000 -0.0014 
17021 554 6,566,364 0.0052 0.0072 1.000 -0.0013 
17029 320 3,216,151 0.0059 0.0116 1.000 -0.0059 
17031 10 55,105 0.0394 0.1147 1.000 0.1040 
17039 320 3,814,526 0.0070 0.0213 1.000 -0.0197 
17041 350 3,895,828 0.0058 0.0130 1.000 -0.0102 
17045 350 4,780,573 0.0046 0.0156 1.000 -0.0111 
17053 743 6,395,798 0.0174 0.0282 1.000 0.0233 
17057 308 3,626,575 0.0149 0.0311 1.000 -0.0151 
17059 76 1,677,293 0.0206 0.0336 0.993 0.0252 
17061 154 2,145,839 0.0166 0.0499 1.000 -0.0373 
17063 523 5,387,674 0.0136 0.0202 1.000 0.0080 
17067 565 4,926,040 0.0138 0.0318 1.000 -0.0260 
17071 288 3,646,604 0.0107 0.0125 0.978 0.0010 




























17073 745 9,566,408 0.0098 0.0149 1.000 -0.0002 
17075 1346 14,415,353 0.0176 0.0238 1.000 0.0110 
17077 21 150,004 0.0202 0.0930 1.000 -0.0890 
17083 94 1,143,267 0.0110 0.0140 0.928 0.0046 
17087 13 150,446 0.0303 0.1219 1.000 -0.0764 
17091 793 8,163,252 0.0148 0.0207 1.000 -0.0001 
17093 235 2,704,281 0.0180 0.0310 1.000 0.0286 
17095 381 4,111,280 0.0087 0.0146 1.000 -0.0026 
17097 4 173,329 0.0155 0.0201 0.768 0.0155 
17099 1166 11,754,606 0.0118 0.0121 0.803 0.0054 
17103 466 7,524,117 0.0082 0.0088 0.859 0.0037 
17105 1975 16,729,360 0.0170 0.0267 1.000 0.0250 
17107 664 7,903,640 0.0076 0.0144 1.000 -0.0013 
17109 377 4,737,358 0.0073 0.0180 1.000 -0.0141 
17113 1160 12,435,805 0.0084 0.0108 1.000 -0.0045 
17115 510 6,085,786 0.0058 0.0091 1.000 -0.0034 
17117 269 2,774,366 0.0094 0.0316 1.000 -0.0271 
17123 423 4,529,180 0.0095 0.0119 1.000 0.0022 
17125 176 1,978,256 0.0129 0.0928 1.000 -0.0876 
17127 6 44,567 0.0359 0.0500 0.855 0.0120 
17129 262 3,302,585 0.0071 0.0249 1.000 -0.0194 



























17131 397 4,432,910 0.0129 0.0209 1.000 -0.0050 
17133 145 941,713 0.0321 0.0605 1.000 0.0257 
17137 181 1,914,212 0.0059 0.0137 1.000 -0.0077 
17139 310 3,555,468 0.0088 0.0093 0.774 0.0085 
17141 289 5,766,673 0.0099 0.0110 0.902 0.0087 
17143 293 2,875,329 0.0118 0.0274 1.000 -0.0143 
17147 487 6,496,606 0.0075 0.0087 0.998 0.0083 
17149 145 2,276,467 0.0130 0.0294 1.000 -0.0164 
17151 5 45,588 0.0120 0.1461 1.000 -0.1232 
17153 4 19,114 0.0289 0.0046 0.000 0.0021 
17155 159 1,791,669 0.0115 0.0116 0.606 0.0036 
17157 47 444,936 0.0386 0.0324 0.189 -0.0018 
17161 158 1,847,829 0.0150 0.0240 0.999 0.0006 
17163 121 736,448 0.0149 0.0308 1.000 0.0061 
17167 333 4,717,649 0.0073 0.0318 1.000 -0.0263 
17169 184 1,586,157 0.0093 0.0315 1.000 -0.0290 
17171 83 1,058,343 0.0063 0.0099 0.999 -0.0008 
17175 327 3,922,749 0.0082 0.0091 0.922 0.0063 
17179 430 4,612,378 0.0078 0.0342 1.000 -0.0279 
17181 23 233,466 0.0100 0.0631 1.000 -0.0618 



























17183 740 7,358,191 0.0165 0.0311 1.000 -0.0225 
17187 538 6,556,423 0.0080 0.0098 1.000 -0.0012 
17193 153 1,979,841 0.0199 0.1174 1.000 -0.1018 
17195 298 5,184,436 0.0136 0.0326 1.000 -0.0158 
17197 473 3,782,134 0.0215 0.0325 1.000 0.0247 
17199 21 214,966 0.0444 0.1594 1.000 -0.1080 




























38003 523 2,122,674 0.0263 0.0423 1.000 -0.0298 
38005 234 888,615 0.0322 0.0529 1.000 -0.0429 
38017 483 2,800,233 0.0239 0.0318 1.000 -0.0151 
38019 499 2,300,184 0.0671 0.1026 1.000 0.0993 
38021 112 801,911 0.0189 0.0179 0.295 -0.0028 
38027 103 382,862 0.0325 0.0298 0.258 0.0033 
38031 163 810,144 0.0315 0.0323 0.633 0.0136 
38035 329 1,726,486 0.0259 0.0276 0.890 0.0060 
38039 186 751,668 0.0347 0.0404 0.986 0.0295 
38045 284 1,269,369 0.0306 0.0272 0.047 0.0123 
38063 193 738,695 0.0388 0.0421 0.881 0.0339 
38067 272 1,217,504 0.0422 0.0601 1.000 0.0561 
38071 191 1,035,185 0.0568 0.0736 0.950 0.0636 
38073 189 717,172 0.0196 0.0218 0.940 -0.0035 
38077 284 1,194,102 0.0190 0.0350 1.000 -0.0243 
38079 171 617,210 0.0335 0.0376 0.898 0.0128 
38081 183 715,865 0.0230 0.0331 1.000 -0.0226 
38091 287 1,318,341 0.0286 0.0369 0.999 0.0358 
38093 487 2,317,639 0.0299 0.0317 0.883 -0.0062 
38095 275 1,358,020 0.0460 0.0542 0.991 0.0437 
38097 262 1,149,627 0.0281 0.0271 0.273 0.0178 




























38099 319 1,533,121 0.0361 0.0385 0.858 0.0287 
38103 340 1,346,249 0.0304 0.0381 0.999 -0.0023 
46005 28 129,690 0.0226 0.0250 0.750 0.0236 
46011 24 36,743 0.0242 0.0213 0.244 0.0166 
46025 92 225,884 0.0348 0.0348 0.528 0.0184 
46029 108 228,713 0.0265 0.0278 0.729 0.0235 
46037 143 484,563 0.0274 0.0242 0.084 0.0208 
46039 41 58,943 0.0372 0.0591 0.997 0.0573 
46051 56 115,090 0.0316 0.0434 0.996 0.0426 
46057 20 35,870 0.0299 0.0496 0.998 0.0489 
46077 17 34,095 0.0341 0.0337 0.512 0.0328 
46079 2 2,182 0.0272 0.0555 0.959 0.0555 
46091 86 302,475 0.0224 0.0273 0.976 -0.0151 
46097 7 30,193 0.0420 0.0675 0.967 0.0675 
46109 185 528,595 0.0195 0.0207 0.784 0.0201 
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Chapter 5:  Conclusion 
 
  For much of its history, participation in the Federal crop insurance program has 
been low while underwriting losses have been large.  Premium subsidy increases in 1995 
and 2000 raised participation rates to roughly 80 percent of eligible acres and, on a 
national scale, brought premiums and indemnities roughly into balance.  Nonetheless, 
problems remain.  Public expenditure for premium subsidies is large ($2 billion in 2003 
alone), even as some regions continue to experience underwriting losses. 
 The RMA premium rating model may be part of the problem.  In theory, 
premiums should equal the expected crop insurance indemnity on a farm-specific basis.  
The RMA model uses a county-level estimate of yield loss risk with a farm-specific 
adjustment based on yield averages.  If farms located in the same area have the same 
average yield but differ in terms of yield loss risk, the RMA premium rating model will 
not capture this difference, leading to asymmetric information problems.  If premium 
rating error can be reduced, on average, through the use of farm-specific data, it may be 
possible to reduce underwriting losses and, perhaps, premium subsidy expenditures.  The 
fact that underwriting losses persist in only some regions suggests that there are regional 
differences in asymmetric information. 
The focus of Chapters 2, 3, and 4, was on understanding the relationship between 
RMA crop insurance yield history data and RMA rating of yield loss risk. Comparing 
yield loss history to yield based premiums shows wide variation across producers.  In 
Table 3.3, for example, the difference between average yield loss (calculated from yield 
histories) and RMA yield-based premium rates (assuming 75 percent coverage for both) 
varies from $-0.045 to 0.043 in the Corn Belt and $-0.053 to $0.209 in the Northern 
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Plains.  The statistical question underlying the analysis of Chapters 3 and 4 is this: Could 
these observed differences between farm-specific yield loss, implied by yield data, and 
RMA yield-based premium rates have arisen by chance, or are they likely to represent 
real differences?  If these differences are real, could they explain differences in 
underwriting losses across regions?  And, more to the point, can yield history data be 
used to improve crop insurance premium rating?   
 There is a lot of evidence to suggest that differences between farm-specific yield 
loss and RMA premium rates are real, particularly where crop production is relatively 
risky.  Chapter 3 was constructed around a test of asymmetric information in crop 
insurance premium rating, although the term “asymmetric information” is a bit of 
misnomer given that all data used in the analysis was obtained from RMA.  In this case, 
the term refers to information that may be embedded in the RMA data but is not used by 
RMA in premium rating.   
Chapter 3 showed that producer behavior (selection of crop insurance coverage 
level) is linked to premium rating errors, which were isolated by regressing average yield 
loss (from yield histories) on an RMA measure of yield loss risk (the Adjusted Base Rate 
or ABR).  Producers with high yield loss relative to their ABR tend to purchase more 
insurance (higher coverage) than other producers, as predicted by the theory developed 
by Rothsechild and Stiglitz.  The affect of asymmetric information is larger in the 
Northern Plains, where crop production is riskier than it is in the Corn Belt (see Tables 
2.7 and 2.8). 
 The analysis in Chapter 4 appears to confirm the basic results of Chapter 3; that 
average yield losses estimated from production history are systematically different from 
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RMA premium rates (the ABR).  In the simulation model developed in Chapter 4, I 
assumed that existing yield histories accurately reflect farm-specific yield distributions. 
Given this assumption, theoretically correct premiums, adjusted for loss reserves, etc., 
were calculated and compared to (1) RMA premium rates and (2) theoretically correct 
“alternate” premiums calculated from small samples drawn from the farm-specific yield 
distributions.   
These alternate premium rates came closer to the theoretically correct premium 
rates, on average when each region is viewed in whole. In every one of the 1,000 Monte 
Carlo simulations run on each region, the alternate premium rates calculated from small 
samples using theoretically correct rating methods were, on average, closer to 
theoretically correct rates than are the RMA rates (the ABR).  Here, the results of Chapter 
4 strongly support those of Chapter 3:  In a broad sense, both models confirm that 
asymmetric information is an issue in both regions.  The results suggest that it would be 
possible, on average, to improve the actuarial correctness of crop insurance premiums 
using farm-specific information on yield variability. 
 Broadly, the analysis suggests that premium rating does contribute to inter-
regional differences in underwriting loss.  In the Corn Belt, RMA premiums (ABRs) 
were estimated to be, on average across all farms in the region, $0.0024/$ liability too 
high. This result is consistent with the results drawn from Table 3.8, namely that net 
return to coverage is modestly negative, on average, for a wide range of producers.   In 
the Northern Plains, RMA premiums (ABRs) were, on average, $0.145/$ liability too 
low.  This result is also consistent with the Northern Plains results reported in Table 3.8, 
in the sense that positive net returns are the norm among producers with positive 
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asymmetric information effects and were generally more common among Northern Plains 
producers than among Corn Belt producers.  
 At the county and farm level, however, simulation results paint a more mixed 
picture and point toward potential difficulties in implementation of alternate premium 
rates.  Alternate premiums are, on average, closer to the theoretical (actuarially fair) rate 
with probability of at least 0.95 in 85 percent of Corn Belt counties but only 50 percent of 
Northern Plains counties.  At the farm level, 33 percent of Corn Belt insurance liability 
(in this sample; 94 million bushels of 284 million bushels) is on farms where alternate 
premium rates can be shown (with probability of at least 0.95) to be closer to theoretical 
(actuarially fair) rates than are RMA premiums.  In the Northern Plains, only 18 percent 
of insurance liability is on farms where alternate rates are demonstrably closer to 
actuarially fair rates when compared to RMA rates.  In both regions, for a large majority 
of cases for which farm-level alternate premiums are demonstrably closer than RMA 
rates to actuarially fair rates, the alternate premium rate is, on average, lower than the 
RMA rate.         
If RMA officials determine to go forward with a premium rating mechanism that 
incorporates farm-specific information on yield variability, transition rules would be a 
critically important component of the new policy.  Assuming current rates (ABRs) are 
taken as starting point, what criteria would be used to judge whether alternate premium 
rates are “different enough” to warrant a rate adjustment?  One could think of this 
question in terms of updating premium rates based on the additional information gathered 
through annual yield reports. When is a yield loss (the idiosyncratic portion only) large 
enough that it should be viewed as evidence of need for a premium increase, rather than a 
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normal fluctuation that is to be expected?  It is easy to imagine rules involving some type 
of Bayesian updating of yield distributions as additional yield information becomes 
available.  Moreover, given that current premium rating rules limit producer premium 
increases to 20 percent per year, some additional mechanism may be needed to limit the 
rate of change.  
The premium rate discounts recently proposed by Rejesus et al., would be at least 
a partial implementation of alternate premiums.  Premium discounts would be based on 5 
years worth of yield performance. The authors argue that 5 years is a compromise 
between sampling error associated with small samples and the need to provide discounts 
based on a reasonably short period of good performance.  Evidence from Chapter 4 
suggests the appropriateness of discounts, in a statistical sense, is difficult to judge even 
based on 8-10 years worth of data, let alone 5 years.  The Rejesus et al., approach is an 
attempt to improve premium rating, on average, with the understanding that farm-specific 
premiums will still be erroneously rated.  Reducing the overall level of deviation from 
actuarial fairness would also require premium surcharges, which would be somewhat 
more difficult to implement both statistically and politically, as highlighted by the 
potential large increases and lack of statistical evidence in support of farm level premium 
increases (see figures 4.1 and 4.2). 
Updating rules could be explored using a dynamic version of the simulation 
model developed in Chapter 4.  For each model farm, an initial draw of 4-10 yield 
observations could be used to calculate an initial premium rate.  (RMA requires at least 4 
actual yields before transitional or “T” yields are dropped from the rate yield calculation, 
but uses no more than 10 yields.)  Subsequent yield draws (one yield at a time to simulate 
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the inflow of annual yield data) could be used to update premium rates using various 
updating rules.  Can updating rules be devised to encourage premium rates to converge 
toward the theoretically correct premium rate?  Can premium rates come close to 
theoretical rates within a reasonable period of time (3-5 years) without being susceptible 
to following outliers?   A Monte Carlo simulation that involved 1,000 or more of these 
simulation experiments could provide useful insight on the design of premium discount 
and surcharge mechanisms.    
 Two of the many challenges that would face policy makers in devising specific 
update rules would be the recognition of yield trends and identification of yield outliers.  
As shown in Chapter 2, it can be difficult to capture time trends.  Moreover, parametric 
functional forms that could be useful in defining outliers are generally not an exact fit for 
crop yield data.  Some parametric distributions (gamma-minus in particular) may come 
close enough to be useful in developing rules about the treatment of yield observation 
that are far from the bulk of previous observations.    
 Ironically, the transition to an alternate method of premium rating may be easier 
in the Corn Belt – where the effect of asymmetric information is relatively small – than in 
the Northern Plains – where asymmetric information effects are larger.  Partly, that is true 
because Corn Belt yields are more consistent (less variable) over time and across farms.  
Premium rate adjustments, where they are made for Corn Belt farms, would be smaller 
than the adjustments that would be required in the Northern Plains.  Moreover, farm-level 
differences between RMA and alternative rates are more likely to be statistically 
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